



MALMÖ UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF CULTURE
AND SOCIETY

A communication analysis for UNICEF Lebanon

A media landscape of Lebanon, media consumption habits of Syrian refugees and potential C4D interventions to promote social inclusion and child/youth protection for Syrian children and youths in Lebanon

Abigail Leffler & Yee-Yin Yap

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Supervisor: Oscar Hemer

Abstract:

The objective of this study is to put forward informed C4D recommendations to help organizations like UNICEF combat the situation for Syrian refugee children and youths in Lebanon, who through displacement and resettling into the complex Lebanese socio-political landscape may be at risk of becoming a lost generation. This paper focuses on the prevention and elimination of actions such as bullying, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, and early marriage.

Conceptual framework: the communication theoretical framework considers Bourdieu's habitus model as well as the uses and gratification model. Concepts conducive to social cohesion include citizenship, communitas and cosmopolitanism.

Methodology: data were gathered through a variety of primary and secondary sources. The former includes semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts and analysis of UNICEF's external communication practices. The latter comprises the collection, assessment, comparison and summarizing of various reports about Lebanese media.

Findings: Lebanon has a pluralistic media landscape, though it appears fragmented, reflecting its socio-political sectarian situation. The media in Lebanon is criticized for lack of public service. The arts scene seems to fill a void in terms of examining the collective memory in respect of not only the civil war (1975-1990) but also of social issues arising as a result of globalization and modernity. Syrians in Lebanon consume Lebanese media as much as media from their own country. Interpersonal communication channels appear to be the preferred mode of communication among both the host and the refugee communities, although among the youth social media platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook are commonplace. Among the traditional media channels, television appears to be popular. The representation of Syrian refugees in Lebanese media is varied, with about one fourth of the published material portraying Syrians as a security issue.

Results: a series of C4D recommendations that use sports and the arts as an overarching theme.

Key words:

Bullying; C4D interventions; child protection & inclusion; children & youth; communication channels; digital media; early marriage; gender-based violence; interpersonal communication channels; Lebanon; media channels; media consumption habits; media landscape; public service; refugees; sectarianism; sexual harassment; social communication; Syrian refugees; traditional media; UNICEF Lebanon.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

BCC	Behaviour Change Communication (at individual level)
C4D	Communication for Development
C-Change	Communication for Change
ComDev	Communication for Development
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO	Civil Society Organization
e.g.	<i>Exempli gratia</i> ('for the sake of example')
GBV	Gender-based Violence
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
i.e.	<i>Id est</i> ('that is')
IOM	International Organization of Migration
IT	Internet Technology
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices
km	Kilometre(s)
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transsexual
Logframe	Logical Frame
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PR	Public Relations
SBCC	Social Behaviour Change Communication (at community level)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats
TIB	Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour
ToR	Terms of Reference
TV	Television
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Project
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization

1 INTRODUCTION

This Production Project was originally envisioned to be linked to UNICEF Lebanon’s KAP study¹, conducted, among others, by ComDev programme professor Dr Ronald Stade during 2017. As such, the central idea of the project is to produce a media landscape study of Lebanon, and thereafter propose relevant C4D recommendations.

In this light, the project team students Abigail Leffler and Yee-Yin Yap, supervised by Dr Oscar Hemer, travelled to Beirut, Lebanon, to conduct a one-week field trip from 19th to 26th March 2017. During the trip, the team met with several key persons, from academics to media practitioners to activists, whose information provided the basis of the framework for this project in terms of media consumption patterns for Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

As the project progressed, time constraints as well as other circumstances beyond the control of the project team emerged, and it was realized that the KAP study would serve more as an inspiration and provide informal reference for the research work of the project. Therefore, the end result of this production project is developed to function more as an independent, in-depth desk review of the Lebanese mediascape and Syrian refugees’ media consumption, with the objective of proposing various feasible interventions for UNICEF Lebanon to carry out in line with their work on Syrian children and youths in Lebanon.

2 BACKGROUND

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2.1 LEBANON

Located on the eastern flanks of the Mediterranean, the Republic of Lebanon shares borders with Syria to the north and the east, Israel to the south, and Cyprus to the west across the sea. The capital city and administrative unit sits in Beirut. The country, 225 km long and 46 km wide, is ancient and ‘features in the writings of Homer and in the Old Testament. Its cities were major outposts and seaports in Phoenician and Roman times, just two of the great civilizations that touched this important Middle Eastern crossroads’ (Lebanon Ministry of Tourism, 2011). Its official language is Arabic, but French is widely spoken (particularly amongst its Christian population) as well as English, which is popular amongst the youth.

Lebanon as we know it today was created ‘when the French mandate expanded the borders of the former autonomous Ottoman Mount Lebanon district, forming in September 1920 the Lebanese Republic’ (UNDP Lebanon, 2017). The country gained independence in 1943 and became a member of the UN system in 1945.

Geographically there are four regions in Lebanon, which are distinguished by their topography and climate. From west to east they include the coastal plain, the Mount Lebanon range, the Bekaa valley and the Anti-Lebanon range –a stretch of arid mountains raising to the east of the Bekaa valley forming part of the eastern border with Syria (see Lebanon Ministry of Tourism, 2011). Lebanon is as diverse geographically as it is politically and demographically.

¹ A KAP (knowledge, attitudes, and practices) study is a cross-sectional survey conducted regionally or nationally to gather data on specific areas. It serves as a diagnosis of the community, and informs an organization’s strategic planning. Some KAP studies make it to the public domain but, unfortunately, at the time of writing the UNICEF Lebanon 2017 KAP study was still being drafted and, therefore, not made available to us.

The country has a population of approximately of 4.4 million, but according to one of our key interviewees this figure is contested since there has been no census in Lebanon since 1932. The urban population is estimated at 87.8% and the annual average growth rate at 6% (UN Data, 2017), although this figure has been increased significantly with the recent influx of Syrian refugees. It has been suggested that the refugee influx may alter the Lebanese sectarian demographic status quo, 'impacting the fragile country's fraught and dangerous politics' (Dettmer, 2013). It should be noted, however, that '251 towns and villages, mainly in the peripheral areas of Lebanon are estimated to host 87% of all refugees and 67% of all deprived Lebanese. 79% of the refugees from Syria are women and children' (UNDP Lebanon, 2017).

Lebanon follows a 'special political system known as confessionalism, distributing power proportionally among its various religious sects, of which more than 18 are officially recognized' (UNDP Lebanon, 2017). This is also sometimes referred to as 'sectarianism', and permeates into all aspects of life, for example, in the media and in the education sectors. Indeed, the political system is 'based on the representation of sects. The Lebanese state recognizes eighteen sects, the formal representatives of which have a variety of powers by virtue of their relationship with the state' (Henley, 2016). This includes the Islamic sects of the Sunni; Shia; Druze; Alawite; and Ismaili; the Maronites; and other Christian sects. Religious leaders in Lebanon 'run places of worship, schools, and personal-status courts that adjudicate many aspects of the daily lives of Lebanese citizens, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Outside their communities, they function as spokesmen in their communities' interactions with public authorities' (Henley, 2016).

During the 1975-1990 Civil War 'seriously damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure' (UNDP Lebanon, 2017), from which the country is still recovering. The country is reported to have achieved success towards the SDG, notably in health, primary education and gender equality in education (see UNDP Lebanon, 2017).

2.2 REFUGEES IN LEBANON

International migration, in all its forms, is 'marked by a global governance deficit: there is no international body with a mandate to set standards and to ensure that migrants receive protection and access to human rights' (Castles, 2011, p. 248). Regrettably, the International Organization of Migration 'remains outside of the UN framework and has no explicit normative mandate other than a service provider to states that pay for its services' (Betts, 2011, p. 2). The global refugee regime is based on the role of UNHCR and on the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, based on the principle of *non-refoulement*², and the right to legal recourse against unfair or discriminatory treatment (see Betts, 2011, p. 16). It should be noted, furthermore, that 'while the right to leave any country is enshrined in the international law (e.g., the UDHR), there is no corresponding right to be received by another state, except in situations when international protection is being sought' (Thatun & Heissler, 2013, p. 100). Palestinian refugees have a dedicated body dealing with their needs: UNRWA.

While the 1951 Convention 'was originally confined geographically to Europe, it was made universal by the 1967 Protocol to the Convention' (Loescher & Milner, 2011, p. 191). Lebanon, however, is 'neither party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, nor does it have any national legislation dealing with refugees' (Janmyr, 2016, p. 59). Syrians have been able to move to Lebanon by virtue of the 1933 Syrian-Lebanese bilateral agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination, which 'sets out principles of free movement of goods and people, and

² *Non-refoulement* represents the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where they risk persecution.

granted freedom of work, residence and economic activity for nationals of both countries' (Janmyr, 2016, p. 65). Legal residency is initially granted for a period of six months and can be subsequently extended, but it is costly, and Syrian refugees tend to live in precarious circumstances. As an example, Verme *et al* report that 'in 2014, 7 in 10 registered Syrian refugees living in Jordan and Lebanon could be considered poor. This number increases to 9 in 10 figures if the poverty lines used by the respective host countries are considered' (Verme, *et al.*, 2015, p. xvi).

In the case of Lebanon, the refugee issue is, somewhat unsurprisingly, owed to sectarian practices in the country, which are highly politicized, and 'the Government's stance towards Syrian refugees can be explained on the one hand by Lebanon's previous refugee experience with Palestinians, and, on the other, by the major antagonistic political parties' conflicting attitudes towards the conflict in Syria' (Janmyr, 2016, p. 60). In fact, the Lebanese government 'is bitterly divided between competing political factions, which has prevented it from devising a coherent framework for managing the refugee crisis' (Clarke, 2016, p. 95). It has been reported that 'as a consequence of sectarian violence and tensions, displaced Syrians largely settle according to their confessional background' (Thorleifsson, 2016, p. 1073). With management of refugees thus becoming an 'ad hoc affair' (Clarke, 2016, p. 95), the responsibility for the various tasks is then divided between the State and humanitarian organizations: where the former is often concerned with the inflow of refugees and the impact on the host population, the latter operates on a desire to alleviate suffering and ensure human rights are upheld.

It is noteworthy that the Lebanese authorities refuse to host the Syrian refugees in camps, out of concern 'that such camps may turn into permanent settlements and spaces for insurgent activity, which happened to the numerous Palestinian refugee camps Lebanon has housed since 1948' (Thorleifsson, 2016, p. 1074). Most vocal about opposing the camps has been the Hezbollah sect, who claim that they 'cannot accept refugee camps for Syrians in Lebanon because any camp will become a military pocket that will be used as a launch pad against Syria and then against Lebanon' (Dettmer, 2013). Moreover, organizations such as 'UNHCR only give[s] aid to refugees who register. As in any other countries hosting Syrians, many refugees chose not to register with UNHCR out of fear of disclosing their name and place of residence to authorities associated with the Lebanese government' (Thorleifsson, 2016, p. 1074). This situation makes it difficult for aid organizations to coordinate aid and reach the Syrian refugees effectively. Moreover, during one of our key interviews, it was pointed out to us that considering two categories of Syrian refugees in Lebanon (those who can afford to live in houses and those who live in camps³) would bear relevance to this study.

UNICEF reports that prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, Lebanon hosted approximately 455,000 Palestinians across 12 camps. During the past six years, this figure has been engrossed by 'over a million Syrian that have fled Syria for Lebanon –equivalent to nearly a quarter of the usual resident Lebanese population' (UNICEF, n.d.). Effectively, Lebanon has now 'the highest per capita rate of refugees worldwide' (Inter-Agency 2015a, in Ostrand, 2015, p. 262). This estimate includes UNHCR-registered and unregistered Syrians, and Palestinians who were refugees in Syria and are fleeing the violence of civil war. It should be noted, however, that 'there are no official camps in Lebanon for Syrian refugees. Refugees live in informal tented settlements or with host families, while others are renting accommodation' (UNICEF Lebanon, n.d.). Approximately 85% of the Syrian refugees are said to settle in three Lebanese governorates: Bekaa (36%), North Lebanon (25%) and Mount Lebanon (25%) (see Verme *et al*, 2015). Furthermore, and important to this study, 'most

³ We highlight that in the context of Syrian refugees 'camps' means 'informal settlements'.

refugees are children who therefore have specific needs in terms of schooling, training, and health care' (Verme, *et al.*, 2015, p. 44).

2.3 UNICEF

UNICEF, the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund, has been active during nearly 70 years working to 'improve the lives of children and their families' and has presence across 190 countries (UNICEF, 2017). It was created in the wake of World War II to provide 'emergency relief through finance and support for children who were victims of the war' (Jolly, 2014, p. 10). The organization is headquartered in New York, and counts with 'seven regional offices as well as country offices worldwide, a research centre in Florence, a supply operation in Copenhagen and offices in Geneva, Tokyo and Brussels' (UNICEF, 2017). UNICEF finances its operations entirely from voluntary contributions, of which it is estimated that 'nearly a quarter are a contribution from individuals, national committees and private funds, a proportion far exceeding other parts of the UN' (Jolly, 2014, p. 22).

UNICEF should be understood, perhaps most importantly, as 'a significant player in global governance regimes aimed at the implementation of the 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child' (Jolly, 2014, p. ix), and the SDG. Its policies and procedures guide its field operations, and 'set out the scope and breadth of a human rights-based approach to programming' (Jolly, 2014, p. 123). The main focal points are child protection and inclusion; child survival; education; gender issues; health and nutrition; WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene); as well as disaster response. The beneficiaries group has been expanded to include youth and young mothers.

Part of the United Nations system, UNICEF is guided by the basic principles of UN Coherence and the attainment of sustainable results (UNICEF, 2017). In order to achieve these goals, UNICEF functions as an 'institutional structure embodying decentralized authority, which encourages initiative and leadership at all levels' (Jolly, 2014, p. 3), and also collaboration with other UN agencies such as UNHCR and the WHO, non-governmental organizations, civic organizations, and international experts. Indeed, 'the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is interested in migration because migrants have human rights; United Nations Population Fund works on migration insofar as it touches upon issues relating to demography and fertility; United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS touches on migration because migrants sometimes have HIV/AIDS' (Betts, 2011, p. 16), and so forth. This facilitates expertise and resources exchange, with 'the other agencies providing the more technical and scientific information and UNICEF contributing from its field experience, especially in relation to social mobilization and community participation' (Jolly, 2014, p. 24). The latter, understood as 'a two-way process for sharing ideas and knowledge using a range of communication tools and approaches that empower individuals and communities to take actions to improve their lives' (UNICEF, n.d.) is acknowledged by UNICEF (and further afield) as 'the Communication for Development approach' (see our reference on UNICEF/Communication for Development, n.d.).

UNICEF's strategy and global governance are generally guided by the principle of the child as a rights-holder, and upholds five key elements: (1) a global perspective; (2) a catalyst role towards awareness, attitude and commitment among communities; (3) political mobilization geared at winning support at the highest political level and opposition groups; (4) social mobilization, to bring in the private sector in the distribution of low-cost remedies and materials to the general public; and (5) suitable technologies (see Jolly, 2014, pp. 82-83). The six principles of human rights guiding UNICEF's programming in all phases include 'universality and inalienability; indivisibility; interdependency and interrelatedness; equality and non-discrimination; participation and inclusion;

and accountability and the rule of law' as well as the principle of transparency (see Jolly, 2014, pp. 125-126).

2.4 UNICEF LEBANON AND THE 'NO LOST GENERATION' INITIATIVE

UNICEF started operations in the Eastern Mediterranean area in Beirut in 1948. During the time of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), UNICEF was the only UN agency with presence in the country. In February 1984, 'a serious aggravation of the civil war in Lebanon forced the regional Middle East and North Africa [MENA] office to move Amman in Jordan and, since that date, UNICEF Beirut has become a Country Office, extending its services to Lebanon alone' (UNICEF Lebanon, n.d.). During its early phase, UNICEF's work included initiatives in health and education such as immunization campaigns against tuberculosis; the setting of a Mother and Child Health programme; the implementation of a malaria eradication campaign; the organization of pre-school children teaching training; and the setting up of the first rehabilitative centre for physically handicapped children (see UNICEF, n.d.). Following the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990 and its ratification as an integral part of International Law, the 'UNICEF Lebanon office worked in earnest towards fully aligning its activities to the challenges propounded by this historical agreement' (UNICEF Lebanon, n.d.). It followed that UNICEF Lebanon set up a number of advocacy steps that were 'well received by Lebanon's official and private media' (UNICEF Lebanon, n.d.). UNICEF Lebanon is a permanent member to the Higher Council for Children, which was set up to group representatives of the Lebanese Ministries and national NGOs concerned with the welfare of children, and which runs under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Social Affairs (see UNICEF Lebanon, n.d.).

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At the time of writing, the focus of the UNICEF Lebanon country office is two-pronged: the Lebanon Country Program (2010-2014 cycle) and the Palestinian Area Program (2011-2013 cycle, which is part of an area arrangement between Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) (see UNICEF Lebanon, n.d.). In light of the dire situation for Syrian refugees in the host country, UNICEF Lebanon is committed to the 'No Lost Generation' strategy, envisioning a range of initiatives to address needs under UNICEF Lebanon's five key programmes, which are (1) Education; (2) Health; (3) WASH; (4) Child Protection; and (5) Youth. Each of these areas is informed by a range of output indicators, which form the basis of their KAP ('Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices') study, and whose results in turn are used to support and justify initiatives and interventions the organization supports.

The 'No Lost Generation' initiative seeks to combat the situation for Syrian refugee children and youth in Lebanon, who through displacement and re-settling into the Lebanese host community are at risk of becoming a lost generation. Many Syrian children, to bring an example from the educational sector, have been unable to attend schools or any form of education whilst in Lebanon either because they must work for their upkeep, or due to 'difficulties in keeping up with the Lebanese curriculum because of language barriers'⁴ (UNHCR, 2015). Already in 2013, 80% of Syrian school-age (5-17 years old) refugees in Lebanon were reported to be out of school (UNICEF, World Vision, UNHCR & Save the Children, 2013, p. 6). A later joint report by UNICEF, OCHA and REACH underlined that the main barriers to education for at least 11% of surveyed displaced population in Syria were physical, as in 'distance and/or lack of affordable transportation services to schools' (UNICEF, OCHA & REACH, 2015, p. 70) and informational, with 30% of Syrian refugees indicating a

⁴ In Lebanon, math sciences are taught in either English or French, while in Syria, these are taught in Arabic (see UNHCR, 2015).

'lack of awareness and familiarity with educational facilities' (UNICEF, OCHA & REACH, 2015, p. 71), although the perceptions varied per community.

In addition to the above, researchers Lorraine Charles and Kate Denman report that school attendance among Syrian and Palestinian refugees from Syria is hindered by other factors, such as:

- Prevalence of co-educational schools in Lebanon. In Syria, most primary and secondary schools are same-sexed, which conforms to the conservative nature of Syrian society. Therefore, many conservative Syrian families, especially fathers, are unhappy with their daughters attending mixed schools and thus do not allow them to attend;
- Lack of income. Due to the lack of employment for many Syrian men and women, and in some cases the absence of the male heads of the family, there is a desperate need for income. As a result, many children are being put to work to help support their families instead of attending schools;
- Legal status of Palestinians in Lebanon. Prior to the conflict, Syria arguably provided the best conditions for Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. The conflict has had an enormous impact on their wellbeing and is compounded by their situation of statelessness. Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon are perhaps the most vulnerable sub-group, as many have no official travel documents, have less protection under the law and no legal employment opportunities, unlike the Syrians who have access to services and the legal right to work in Lebanon (...). Without legal residence visas Palestinian Syrian refugees cannot access aid from United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA).

Source: Charles & Denman, 2013, pp. 98-99.

3 EPISTEMOLOGY

3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1.1 Definitions of ‘media’

For the purposes of our research, we will assume media includes mass media in the form of traditional media (television, film, radio, and printed matter such as newspapers, magazines, leaflets, posters and brochures), digital media (websites, online newspapers, blogs and micro-blogs, which are available for computer, tablet and mobile phone platforms) as well as the interpersonal *medium* (word-of-mouth).

Moreover, we argue that the arts sector, in its various forms, also constitutes a form of examination of the self and the collective memory, and that the several forms of expression (literature, painting, photography, sculpture, drama, music and dance) constitute a communication *medium*. Therefore, and even though most media landscapes limit themselves to describing traditional and online media, we have expanded our media landscape to include a review of the main topics underpinning artistic expression in Lebanon.

3.1.2 Information and media consumption: communication models

We consider media theories as ‘a systematic way of thinking about means of communication’ (Laughey, 2007, p. 4). There is an abundance of media theories, each serving a specific focus of research⁵. For the media landscaping portion of our project we planned to collect data inductively, which was challenging at the time of selecting the theory or theories *potentially* bearing relevance to this project.

We believe that, ultimately, a number of aspects are interesting when researching information and media consumption habits among refugee communities, such as mobility, portability, credibility, as well as information precarity and misinformation (rumours). Indeed, the latter is important as it appears that ‘rumour and panic response are the outcome of situations of ambiguity and lack of information’ (Shibutani, 1966, in McQuail, 1977 [1979], p. 17). In this light, once the media landscape in Lebanon has been mapped out, it remains to be asked what media Syrian refugees in Lebanon use (and for which purposes), which media they trust and prefer, and whether there are any information gaps that can be covered through their preferred channels (or media).

The focus on consumption and preferences puts us in the direction of audience studies. In the interest of efficacy, the messenger and information provider (e.g., UNICEF) must become aware of their audience’s preferred channels and actively seek a dialogue with them through such channels. Within this framework, therefore, we singled out Bourdieu’s *habitus* theory model. *Habitus* theory belongs into the consumerism media theory cluster, which has the audience as its main object of study. Bourdieu (1977) aims to show ‘how consumer taste is not a purely personal choice but, rather, is structured according to social circumstances’ (Laughey, 2007, p. 187). Conforming to *habitus* theory, therefore, we believe that in the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon we could expect a preference of Syrian sources over Lebanese sources, and that we could potentially find that interpersonal communication channels are preferred over mediated channels. The latter could have bearing on the absence or scarcity of Syrian media sources, and at the same time it could be owed to

⁵ In general lines, media theory can focus on one or several of behaviour, medium, structure, interaction, feminism, the political economy, postcolonialism, postmodernity and the information society, and consumerism (see for example Laughey, 2007, p. 194).

other factors, such as an increased reliance on social capital, particularly on co-nationals, as a means of coping during crisis situations. In the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, social capital may be linked to the theory of ‘migration networks’, that puts forward that ‘the relations between migrants and their friends/relatives at home act as an information network; this also builds social capital’ (Munck, 2008, p. 1230). In line with the *habitus* theory model, however, we predict that the longer a refugee has lived in exile and established a local network, the more he or she will tend to expand their trusted information sources and accept local mediated channels.

The *habitus* theory model acts as a reference frame to generally understand media habits among Syrian refugees in Lebanon (or anyone else); however, individuals are active media consumers and, as such, in the presence of a range of media channels they exercise their right to choose channels in function of (or in connection with) specific information needs or purposes. For this reason, we argue that relying solely on *habitus* theory does not suffice, as we also need a consumerist theoretical framework focused on *functionality*, such as the *uses and gratification* model, which ‘consider[s] the audience as active users of the [mass] media rather than passive absorbers’ (Howitt, 2013, p. 13).

The *uses and gratification* model takes into consideration a number of aspects that are useful to our research, including *assessment* of information needs and typology considerations of media channel choice *motives*, which can range from information seeking (advice, news, educational material); personal identity (reinforcing personal values); integration and social interaction (relating to others); to entertainment (relaxing, filling time, etc.) (see McQuail *et al.*, 1972, in Windahl, *et al.*, 2012, p. 199). The reason why we think the *uses and gratification* model could be useful to our research is that, ultimately, ‘there is a variety of motives for using the media. There is a widespread but often mistaken assumption among communication planners that people in the audience attend to messages for the reasons the sender intends’ (Windahl, *et al.*, 2012, p. 199). At a later stage McQuail (1984) developed the *uses and gratification* model further, suggesting that researchers ‘should distinguish between cognitive and cultural types of content and media use’ (Windahl, *et al.*, 2012, pp. 200-201). This would have important implications for communication planning, implying that (1) communication officers should have mechanisms in place to ascertain their audience’s information needs and intentions; and that (2) planners should work in an inclusive manner and, in doing so, combine cognitive and cultural models for maximum reach and effect (see for example Windahl, *et al.*, 2012, p. 202).

3.1.3 Communication for Development: understanding and evaluating change

According to June Lennie and Jo Tacchi there is more than one definition of Communication for Development. Throughout our research and during the design phase of our recommendations, we will abide by Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada’s definition, which according to the authors is one of the most comprehensive:

Communication for development is the use of communication processes, techniques and media to help people toward a full awareness of their situation and their options for change, to resolve conflicts, to work towards consensus, to help people plan actions for change and sustainable development, to help people acquire the knowledge and skills they need to improve their condition and that of society, and to improve the effectiveness of institutions (Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 1998, p. 63, in Lennie & Tacchi, 2013, p. 4)

Interventions can target individuals (behavioural change) or communities (social change). In that sense, this project deals with social change. Theories of how social change takes place are of

relevance to us, particularly because they occur in a ‘non-linear, dynamic, emergent and complex’ (Lennie & Tacchi, 2013, p. 8) manner. It should be noted that social change can also take years, often decades, to become apparent.

The notion of participation, or ‘bottom-up approach’ is essential to C4D because it constitutes an ingredient of sustainability. In recommending specific interventions to UNICEF Lebanon, we will be paying heed to Lennie and Tacchi’s seven inter-related components of the framework for evaluating C4D, which include the aspects summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 General framework for the evaluation of C4D interventions

C4D is...	Because...
Complex	It may involve processes that are contradictory and challenging.
Emergent	Processes may be non-linear, dynamic, unpredictable. Communities live in a state of flux.
Participatory	C4D practitioners prefer to partner with the members and stakeholders of the communities they work with.
Holistic	C4D practitioners take account of the wider social, economic, cultural, technological, organizational and institutional contexts.
Critical	C4D seeks to address specific issues of gender, class, ethnicity, age, and other relevant differences, such as power imbalances and deficient or lacking representation among community members.
Realistic	C4D interventions encourage simplicity, practicality, responsiveness, rigour, and a grounding in local realities. To that end, C4D interventions are based on methodological pluralism.
Learning-based	C4D fosters mutual understanding, continuous learning, empowerment, creative thinking, responsiveness to challenges and evaluation of outcomes.

(See Lennie & Tacchi, 2013, p. 22)

Moreover, the evaluation of change fostered by our C4D recommendations will need to be grounded in the notion that there are different ways of programming change, depending on the level at which we wish to measure the change (e.g. social change at community level or behavioural change at individual level). Indeed, the evaluation methodology linked to an intervention will depend on whether the intervention is expected to lead to transformative or projectable change. Lennie & Tacchi propose a number of evaluation approaches, among which the Logframe Matrix Approach (LFA); the Theory of Change (ToC) approach; outcome mapping; development evaluation; participatory monitoring and evaluation; and Ethnographic Action Research (EAR), to name a few. A word of caution, though, as social change is a lengthy process and there are varying views on whether change can be effectively measured or not. Denis McQuail warns for example that ‘changes in culture and in society are slowest to occur, least easy to know with certainty, least easy to trace to their origins, most likely to persist. Changes affecting individuals are quick to occur, relatively easy to demonstrate and to attribute to a source, less easy to assess in terms of significance and performance’ (McQuail, 1977 [1979], p. 9).

3.1.4 Conceptual framework on international migration, refugeeship and human rights

Despite a lack of coherent UN-based multilateral framework regulating states' responses to migration, 'global migration governance can be characterized by a fragmented tapestry of institutions at the bilateral, regional, inter-regional, and multilateral levels, which vary depending on different types of migration' (Betts, 2011, p. 1). The IOM, according to migration expert Alexander Betts, 'remains outside of the UN framework and has no explicitly normative mandate other than as a service provider to states' (Betts, 2011, p. 2).

There are several reasons why individuals and groups migrate, some of them being voluntary and some not. Reasons for migration may be linked to work, lifestyle, environmental reasons but also to flee from violence and persecution. It is this last category that our project is concerned with. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, endorses a single definition of the term 'refugee', namely 'someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership to a particular social group, or political opinion' (UNHCR, 1951 [1967]). Refugees can be classified into two groups: internally displaced persons (moving from a region to another within the same polity) and refugees (moving from one polity to another due to well-grounded fears of violence and/or persecution). In a way, refugees can be said to be 'human rights violations made visible' (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011, p. 27).

Of all the migration categories, and in contrast with the other categories, that of refugees could perhaps be argued to be 'more robust than the governance of other areas of migration' (Loescher & Milner, 2011, p. 189). The field is regulated by a range of areas of public international law, such as international human rights law and international humanitarian law (see Betts, 2011, pp.14-15) in the form of agreements, conventions, and norms, usually overseen by UNHCR, a UN agency with the 'specific mandate from the international community to ensure the protection of refugees and to find a solution to their plight' (Loescher & Milner, 2011, p. 189). Again, it should be borne in mind that 'the absence of a coherent and comprehensive multilateral governance framework means that states can competitively act in their own self-interest' (Betts, 2011, p. 21).

According to Betts, 'the way in which states respond to forced migrants –whether they have crossed borders as refugees or remain within their countries of origin – is highly political. It involves a decision on how to weigh the rights of citizens versus non-citizens' (Betts, 2009, p. 14). The management of refugee crises is, furthermore, 'often an ad hoc affair, with responsibility for various tasks being divided between state and humanitarian authorities' (Clarke, 2016, p. 95). Tensions between state and humanitarian organizations are not unheard of, and 'whereas state agencies are often concerned with limiting the effects of refugee inflows on host populations, humanitarian organizations are motivated by a desire to alleviate the suffering' (Clarke, 2016, p. 95). In a similar vein, there is a tug-of-war between the state and the international community. In fact, as far as a state is concerned, refugee law applies to subjects of another state within its own jurisdiction. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen reports a tension between 'on the one hand the universal claim underpinning both refugee and human rights law and, on the other, principles of national sovereignty anchoring responsibility to the state and its territory' (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011, p. 23). These tensions have important implications for our project. As already mentioned, Lebanon is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. In this light, Lebanon is not formally obliged to acknowledge Syrians fleeing conflict as 'refugees'; instead, Lebanese Government authorities officially regard them as 'displaced persons', which according to Maja Janmyr, is 'a less historically- and legally loaded term' (Janmyr, 2016, p. 59).

Pia Oberoi and Eleanor Taylor-Nicholson argue that the international human rights framework provides valuable tools for addressing matters of migration. They claim that ‘a human rights approach is grounded in the notion that basic human rights are not a matter of charity, but of justice, and should therefore be embodied in transparent, binding standards’ (Oberoi & Taylor-Nicholson, 2013, p. 174). Within the context of migration, however, ‘child migrants occupy a mixed space. In general, children are seen as acted upon, as victims, passive followers of their parents/guardians’ (Whitehead & Hashim, 2005; O’Connell Davidson & Farrow, 2007; Dobson, 2009; Brettel, 2003, in Thatun & Heissler, 2013, p. 97).

The notion of ‘child protection’ is linked to the provisions under the CRC. Pursuant to the CRC, children are entitled to ‘be protected from economic exploitation and harmful work, from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse, from physical or mental violence, and as well as from being separated from their families against their will’ (Thatun & Heissler, 2013, p. 99). Lebanon became a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in January 1990, and ratified this treaty in May 1991⁶. The Committee on the Rights of the Child in their forty-second session in 2006 raised *inter alia* the following observations about Lebanon:

- Bullet point 25: The Committee notes with concern that the minimum age for marriage still depends on a person’s religion (...). It also notes with concern that there are minimum ages for marriage for boys and girls within the same religious or confessional group;
- Bullet point 27: The Committee notes with appreciation that article 7 of the Constitution of Lebanon promotes the principle of non-discrimination. However, it notes with concern that the Constitution and domestic laws guarantee equal status only to Lebanese children, but leave, for example, foreign children and refugee and asylum-seeking children without such protection;
- Bullet point 71: The Committee notes with concern that since the State party does not extend asylum, many children and their families seeking asylum are subject to domestic laws for illegal entry and stay, and thereby are at risk of detention, fines and deportation;
- Bullet point 81: The Committee regrets the inadequate legal framework for the prevention and criminalization of sexual exploitation and trafficking of children, and that victims are criminalized and sentenced to detention. In addition, concern is expressed about existing risk factors contributing to trafficking activities, such as poverty, early marriages and sexual abuse; and
- Bullet point 84: [The Committee] notes with concern that:
 - (a) The minimum age of criminal responsibility, which is set at 7 years, is still much too low;
 - (b) Juveniles can still undergo same penal trial procedures as adults (...)

Source: CRC, 2006 (online).

3.1.5 Social models: in the interest of peaceful cohabitation and world citizenship

In a way, we owe the present refugee situation to ourselves and we should assume joint responsibility, for ‘the world, striated with national boundaries, sees border protection as a powerful statement of collective selfishness’ (Maddox, 2015, p. 3). It is said that with the rise of national boundaries, modern society became equated with ‘society organized in territorially limited nation-states’ (Beck, 2011, p. 1347), and this became the social and political units of modern society. Our passports define the territories within which we are ‘welcome’. In this light, refugees, displaced persons and asylum seekers, ‘become a “disposable population” (Lowman, 2000), their very

⁶ See www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARRegion/Pages/LBIndex.aspx (accessed 31 May 2017).

disposability created through the discourses of abjection. Defined as outsiders, not welcome, marked by stigma and prejudice, where possible they are kept marginalized, beyond citizenship and inclusion' (O'Neill, 2010, pp. 260-261). We share a planet and we share a destiny, so it is in our own interest to find ways to live, not next to one another, but *together*, in a way that benefits us all and that is 'convivial'.

We understand conviviality⁷ as living together despite any differences. Within this context, that of *communitas* or feeling of togetherness, 'the capacity to negotiate and transcend these differences – particularly in a world panicked by international terrorism and fears of uncontrolled flows of asylum seekers – has become of greater political as well as of social importance' (Wise & Noble, 2016, p. 424). Within this context, two concepts become relevant: (1) that of 'cosmopolitanism'; and (2) that of 'shared destiny' or a new global civility, to use the words of Ulrich Beck (2011). Cosmopolitanism is not a new concept. It gained currency with the Cynics and the Stoics in Ancient Greece who, in simple terms, held that 'human beings all belong to the same species and should be thought of a living in world society, governed by natural law and pursuing a goal of harmony' (Heater 2002, p. 30, in Wilde, 2013, p. 3). Therefore, global instruments such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights are vital: not only do they transcend boundaries, but also pave the way (or the aspirations) towards harmonious co-existence. A 'shared destiny' is, according to Beck, constructed on the basis of 'a community with a common destiny in the interests of survival' (Beck, 2011, p. 1353), and he goes on to contrast nationalism with cosmopolitanism, where imagined nationalist communities are deeply embedded in an imagined past, and imagined cosmopolitan communities are 'rooted in the future anticipated in the present. For the first time in history all human beings, all ethnic and religious groups, all populations inhabit the common present of a threatened future of civilization' (Beck, 2011, p. 1354). If nationalism is established within the walls of the nation-state, he wonders, which form of statehood encapsulates the cosmopolitan spirit? The answer to this question is probably food for thought and material for a separate project, but we feel nonetheless that answers should be sought *beyond* the notion of nation-state, or statehood.

Community, or *communitas*, is best understood as a multidimensional concept, including a sense of place, space and shared interests, but these come to light only if they are shared in the public sphere through participatory methods. In terms of research we feel there is a strong connection between the Communication for Development field and the concept of conviviality. For the purposes of our project, we feel it is important to bear in mind that 'just as we need to ask what it is that people do when they draw lines of racial exclusion (Essed, 1991), we need to think about what it is that people do when they build connections' (Wise & Noble, 2016, p. 426). We sense that in the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, *communitas* could be built upon traits in common between the host and the refugee populations, such as shared language, food, music, cultural heritage, arts and sports interests, to name a few. But awareness of the lived experiences of civil and social citizenship⁸ (or the

⁷ There are different acceptances of the term 'conviviality.' In everyday parlance, the term *conviviality* stands for 'the quality of being friendly and lively; friendliness' (Oxford University Press, 2017). In our work, however, we refer to 'conviviality' as peaceful coexistence in multicultural societies. Please note that we do not imply that this is a buzzword in international development co-operation.

⁸ In his monograph *Citizenship and Social Class*, British sociologist T. H. Marshall deconstructed the concept of citizenship and distinguished among three types of citizenship: civil citizenship, encompassing the liberty of the individual, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice; social citizenship, including the right to welfare and the right to a share in the social heritage; and political citizenship, meaning the right to participate in the exercise of political power of a polity. Whereas we acknowledge that Syrian refugees in Lebanon do not hold political citizenship, they should still be entitled to other forms of citizenship, e.g. social and civil citizenship (see Marshall, 1950, pp. 10-11).

lack thereof) can only come from personal testimonies. The dominant narrative can be challenged by means of recovering and re-telling the stories and subjectivities of individuals, to better understand 'the legitimization and rationalisation of power, domination and oppression' (O'Neill, 2010, p. 22). C4D theory and praxis can therefore assist in fostering 'recognition, participation and inclusion in the production of knowledge and public policy' (O'Neill, 2010, p. 21) towards a narrative of peaceful co-habitation.

3.2 FOCUS/PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH

In view of the complex socio-political landscape in Lebanon and the dire situation of the Syrian refugees in this country; in the interest of best C4D practices leading to conviviality and social sustainability; and in support of the 'No Lost Generation' initiative, we are seeking to put forward C4D interventions specifically designed to serve the area of child and youth protection. Considering the broad scope of UNICEF Lebanon's work and the narrow scope of our study, and in the interest of quality and depth, we chose to focus on the prevention and elimination of certain actions such as bullying, sexual harassment and gender-based violence (GBV), and early marriage, but also on the promotion of actions that foster conviviality.

Our project envisages work for and on behalf of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The age span for 'youth' is formally acknowledged by UNICEF as 15-24 (see for example UNDESA, 2013, p. 2), although according to our sources UNICEF Lebanon has a somewhat more generous definition of 'youth', placing it in the age range of 14-26. According to Dr Ronald Stade (2017), 'this group is vulnerable because adolescents and young adults have difficulties finding employment and are often targeted for radicalization and recruitment by militant groups'. It follows from this that the scope of our project is to:

- a) Understand and present information and media consumption habits among Syrian refugee youth in Lebanon;
- b) Assess UNICEF Lebanon's current practices in reaching out to this specific group of the target population;
- c) Identify barriers faced by UNICEF in meeting information needs of Syrian refugee youth in selected areas (e.g. social protection, education, integration); and finally
- d) Recommend C4D interventions to overcome the identified barriers.

3.3 RELEVANCE TO THE COMMUNICATION FOR DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

This project constitutes an exploration of the role of Communication for Development as a framework for social change in the field of International Migration Studies. With the current refugee crisis and global migration trends, C4D methodologies can be key to promote dialogue and peaceful cohabitation among groups and individuals who are ascribed different citizenship (and, with that, different rights) status. We hope that our work will demonstrate the way in which ComDev theory and praxis may be applied to a case study.

3.4 RELEVANCE TO UNICEF LEBANON

C4D constitutes a specific stance to communication programming generally endorsed by UNICEF (see UNICEF/Communication for Development, n.d.). Based on our organizational Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis of UNICEF (current communication

practices) and other results available in the public domain⁹, our recommendations are intended to promote integration and peaceful cohabitation among host and refugee populations in Lebanon, reinforcing UNICEF Lebanon's endorsement and spearheading of C4D methodologies and conceptual framework.

3.5 PRODUCTION PROCESS METHODOLOGY (RESEARCH DESIGN)

3.5.1 Data collection (media landscaping section)

Preliminary research for the project comprised a literature review of publications from international organizations and various articles of the refugee crisis in the Middle East and in Lebanon, carried out during the month of February to mid-March. This was followed by a one-week field trip to Beirut in the third week of March (March 19-26) by the authors, accompanied by the course supervisor Dr Oscar Hemer. The idea of the field trip was to coincide with a research trip that Dr Ronald Stade was making to Beirut for the UNICEF KAP study during the same time period. During the field trip, insight regarding the Lebanese socio-political climate was gleaned, which provided important background for the work of the project. Several interviews with UNICEF staff members, artists and academics were secured, laying the groundwork of a trifecta research area of: communications, sectarianism and peaceful cohabitation, which provided the broad conceptual framework of the project.

The media landscape in Lebanon has been researched and reported quite recently by several parties working in journalism or with the media in general¹⁰. We therefore worked with (i.e., verified, compared, complemented and summarized) these secondary sources to map out the array of media channels available in Lebanon.

For the description of information and media consumption habits of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, we relied on first-hand research and production of primary sources whenever possible, and literature review as supportive data. As we were looking for qualitative data, we worked with inductive methods, to answer questions such as 'Where do they get their information from?' and 'Why are certain media channels preferred?'. Data collection for this part of the project was conducted by means of semi-structured interviews with experts working with media and Syrian refugees. We relied on the snowball sampling method and we found out that we quickly reached saturation point in terms of topics and issues highlighted during the sessions. The advantage of the snowball sampling method is that one expert recommends another. The disadvantage of this method is that it 'does not give a random representation of the population. Indeed, the whole population characteristics (and location) need not even be known' (Olsen, 2012, p. 25).

The UNICEF SWOT organizational analysis rendered what is visible (from an audience perspective) of their communication strategies. During our brief stay in Beirut we had the opportunity to conduct two separate interviews with UNICEF members of staff working in communication. Much of the UNICEF campaigns material is available in the online domain so we complemented the information received from them with our own assessment. For physical reasons, we were unable to assess interventions or any other type of material that is exclusively available in Lebanon while we conducted our research from Sweden. A communication channels matrix and recommended C4D

⁹ E.g. statistics from studies by UNICEF, UNHCR and Statistics Lebanon.

¹⁰ See for example our references to Lorenzo Trombetta from the European Centre of Journalism, n.d.; Sarah El-Richani from Muftah, 2011; Jad Melki *et al.*, 2012; Francesco Schiacchitano on behalf of MedMedia, 2015; Chadia El Meouchi & Marc Dib from Media Law International; and the surveys on ICT habits including the MENA region conducted by Northwestern University Qatar 2016; IPSOS & Nielsen 2016; and the Arab Social Media Influencers Summit 2015 results.

interventions was developed based on what UNICEF Lebanon previously used and an audience stakeholder analysis.

3.5.2 Analysis methods (recommendations section)

We analysed the data from our interviews qualitatively. We were able, for example, to work inductively with grounded theory method to identify themes and concerns. Table 2 presents an overview of the different data sets we worked with, and the qualitative and quantitative analysis methods we employed.

Table 2 Data sets and analysis methods: an overview

Area of study	Qualitative	Quantitative
Lebanese media landscape	<p style="text-align: center;">Lebanese media landscape information</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>(secondary data / validation, comparison, summary of existing reports)</p> </div> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>(secondary data / extraction of statistics and presentation [descriptive] of results relevant to this study)</p> </div> </div>	
Information and media habits of Syrian refugee youth in Lebanon	<p style="text-align: center;">Semi-structured interviews with experts</p> <p>(primary data / grounded theory method)</p>	
SWOT analysis of UNICEF in function of their communication practices targeting beneficiaries	<p style="text-align: center;">UNICEF communication practices</p> <p>(primary data / observation/online sources)</p>	

4 MEDIA LANDSCAPE

4.1 THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN LEBANON

The media landscape described in this section is not exhaustive. It should be borne in mind that the media are a dynamic environment. Therefore, the laws and regulations, institutions, publications listed (both in the body of this paper as well as in the appendices) and indicators provided are subject to change.

4.1.1 Sectarianism in the Lebanese media landscape

4.1.1.1 Two state-owned news agencies

There are two state-owned agencies in Lebanon: the National News Agency¹¹ and *Almarkazia*, the Central News Agency¹²; however, it appears that ‘for many issues journalists are more dependent on foreign news agencies because they are deemed more trustworthy’ (IREX, 2014, pp. 9-10). Given this state of affairs, and owed to ‘the lack of influence exhibited by both state media and the state-run news agencies, news production is overwhelmingly in the realm of non-state media’ (IREX, 2014, p. 10).

4.1.1.2 A plurality of echo chambers

Lebanon’s most distinctive feature is its plurality of media; in fact, it is claimed that ‘all major political factions are represented in the media’ (IREX, 2014, p. viii). This plurality of media, however, has been criticized by different experts for reflecting a sectarian political situation rather than fulfilling a democratising role. Jad Melki *et al.* argue, for instance, that ‘political groups often form around sects and traditional feudal leaders, almost all of whom are supported by foreign countries. Media development, and digital media development in particular, reflects this harsh reality’ (Melki, *et al.*, 2012, p. 6). Indeed, reporting on behalf of the Muftah organization, Sarah El-Richani describes this situation in terms of ‘disorientation’ and ‘fragmentation’, adding that the media system ‘has often served the interests of the political elite instead of catering to the public’ (El-Richani, 2011). Melki *et al.* explain that this is due to ‘the *za’im* (Leader) system, a socio-political power structure where a feudal elite dominates public life and represents the interests of the country’s religious sects, leav[ing] little room for independent and marginalized voices, or for diversity –unless it be the diversity of this same elite’ (Melki, *et al.*, 2012, p. 6).

It is claimed that the situation is deteriorating further, that ‘pluralism in the Lebanese media does not equate to professionalism; [and] neither does it indicate a high level of media freedom’ (IREX, 2014, p. viii). Reporters without Borders ranked Lebanon 99/180¹³ in their 2017 Ranking of Press Freedom on account of their highly politicized media (RSF, 2017), losing one place in respect of the preceding year. In its Corruptions Perceptions Index 2016, Transparency International ranked Lebanon 28/100¹⁴. According to this organization, factors likely to negatively influence the integrity of the media in its capacity of watchdog and promoter of public accountability include ‘media regulations, media ownership, as well as resources and capacity, [making the media] vulnerable to corruption’ (Mendes, 2013, p. 2). In particular the following issues are salient:

¹¹ See <http://nna-leb.gov.lb/en> (accessed 17 April 2017).

¹² See <http://www.almarkazia.net/> (*in Arabic*) (accessed 17 April 2017).

¹³ The higher the score, the lower the freedom of the press.

¹⁴ The country’s score indicates its position relative to other countries, in a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).

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- (a) **deficient journalistic practices**, where ‘sources are poorly cited if they are cited at all and a lot is clearly not fact-checked and many times facts are twisted to fit a certain agenda’ (Lebanese journalist Justin Salhani, in IREX, 2014, p. 6);
 - (b) **self-censorship** of practising journalists, owed primarily to ‘the dual pressures of an intensely partisan media environment and contradictory legislation’ (Fanack, 2017);
 - (c) **reduced funding** resulting from the global financial crisis and competition from online sources, which ‘have put all media that rely on advertising revenue to enter into a painful adjustment period; this adjustment has in its worst cases caused some respected media to shutter their operations or be subsumed into the portfolios of politicized conglomerates’ (IREX, 2014, p. viii);
 - (d) **an increasingly volatile media landscape** owed to the ongoing civil war in neighbouring Syria and the country’s functioning as ‘a regional and international hub to cover the conflict’ (Fanack, 2017); and
 - (e) **a media echo chamber**, where the media choices and formats do not necessarily translate into a plurality of opinions. In fact, ‘many new sources [for example, in the digital domain] simply replicate the voices expressed through traditional media’ (Melki, *et al.*, 2012, p. 6).

4.1.1.3 Market distinctions

Sarah El-Richani reported that, when referring to sectarianism in the Lebanese media sphere, distinction should be made between the different markets. She names the entertainment domain where, for example, ‘due to the small and saturated market, television stations traditionally affiliated with a particular party or group have been forced to diversify, hiring staff from a variety of backgrounds and offering shows that cater to a wider audience, such as traditionally Christian channels offering Ramadan-specific programs’ (El-Richani, 2011). The same scenario would, according to her, not apply to the news and political domain, where programmes ‘continue to appeal only to those sharing the same political leanings’ (El-Richani, 2011).

4.1.2 National media policies

Article 13 of the Lebanese Constitution stipulates that ‘the freedom of opinion, expression through speech and writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association, are all guaranteed within the scope of the law’ (Constitute, n.d., p.5). The Lebanese media landscape was rearranged in the wake of the 1989 Taif Accords that sought to end the Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990. Section III Article 5 bullet G of the Taif Accords document provides that ‘all the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war’ (UN Peacemaker, 1989). According to Sarah El-Richani, new licencing to political/sectarian groups ensued, ‘officially ending the monopoly over electronic broadcasting held by Télé Liban, the state television network, which had effectively been terminated during the civil war’ (El-Richani, 2011). The number of licences issued is, however, limited. Legislative decree 74 of 13/4/1953 regulates the licencing of political periodical publications provides that ‘no new license is to be given to a new political publication as long as Lebanon has more than 25 daily publications and 20 weekly publications’ (El Meouchi & Dib, 2016).

4.1.2.1 Media legislation: the 1962 Press Law and the 1994 Audio-visual Law

The Lebanese press media are mainly governed by the 1962 Press Law (governing the print media) and the 1994 Audio-visual Law (regulating for example radio and television).

The 1962 Press Law ‘defines a journalist as being at least 21 years of age, having a bachelor’s degree and having been apprenticed for at least four years. Practising journalists do not require

certification, although those with a degree in journalism must register with the trade union. Press cards, which must be renewed annually, are issued by the Ministry of Information’ (Sciacchitano, 2015, p. 13). The Press Law provides for the freedom of the press, though it forbids ‘to issue a press publication without first obtaining a license. In practice, obtaining a new license¹⁵ is often difficult and expensive’ (El Meouchi & Dib, 2016). The 1962 Press Law created two syndicates (trade unions), under which journalists are organized:

- The Lebanese Press Syndicate¹⁶, for owners of the Lebanese press; and
- The Editors Syndicate, for editors and reporters (see Sciacchitano, 2015, p. 13).

Though the 1962 Press Law improved the rights of journalists through the creation of the above-mentioned syndicates, at the same time it slashed these by including a proviso on the freedom of expression, noting that ‘nothing may be published that endangers national security... national unity... or that insults high-ranking Lebanese officials... or a foreign head of state’ (Fanack, 2017; Sciacchitano, 2015, p. 13).

The 1994 Audio-visual Law made Lebanon ‘the first Middle Eastern country with a regulatory framework allowing for both private radio and television broadcasting’ (Fanack, 2017). This law led to the creation of the National Audio-visual Council, which ‘was tasked with allocating licences’ (El-Richani, 2011). Pursuant to this law, there are two types of licences:

- **Category I licences:** for the broadcast of news and political programmes; and
- **Category II licences:** for television stations that do not intend to broadcast news or politically-laden material (see Sciacchitano, 2015, p. 14).

It is noteworthy that, under this law, ‘any person or entity is forbidden from owning, directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the total shareholding of a single audio-visual media station. This provision clearly defers from its counterpart in the Press Law where one person can own a newspaper (article 31 of the Press Law)’ (El Meouchi & Dib, 2016).

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4.1.2.2 A note about fair allocation of advertising

According to Francesco Sciacchitano, ‘the Broadcast Law of 1994 is the only Lebanese legal text regulating the media that deals with advertising. It contains content-related provisions (Articles 36 and 37) in addition to a single anti-monopoly article (Article 39) that requires each advertising agency (or “regie”, as agencies are commonly known in Lebanon) to service no more than one television and one radio station at a time’ (Sciacchitano, 2015, p. 29). The author points out, however, that in practice ‘the advertising market is monopolized by a single media group’ (op. cit., p. 29) controlling up to 92% of the national advertising market.

4.1.3 Advertising expenditures in the media mix

According to Sarah El-Richani, ‘no exact figures exist on advertising expenditures, as there is a discrepancy between the inflated rate cards for advertisements and the actual figures, which are lower than reported due to deals and packages offered by media networks’ (El-Richani, 2011). This notwithstanding, a recent IPSOS & Nielsen survey estimates the expenditures to be in the range of 46% for television; 20% for OOH (out of home); 17% for print media; 8% for radio; 8% for digital media; and 1% for cinema –see Figure 1. It is noteworthy that the popularity of television in the

¹⁵ North American spelling.

¹⁶ See <http://www.pressorderlebanon.com/> (*in Arabic*) (accessed 19 April 2017).

MENA¹⁷ region surpasses that of other types of media, although this appears slightly less pronounced in Lebanon. At 20% out-of-home advertising¹⁸, however, seems to catch the attention of the Lebanese (it also caught our attention during our stay in Beirut in March 2017).




Figure 1 Share of Ad Spend by Media Type 2016 (IPSOS & Nielsen, 2017, p. 24)

4.1.4 Professional capacity building and supporting institutions

Lorenzo Trombetta reports that ‘in the early 1990s journalism programmes were set up at the main academic institutions. The public Lebanese University and the four main private universities of the country¹⁹ started to offer degrees in journalism, including postgraduate studies, even though the nature of the syllabuses differed somewhat. The total study period is five to six years (three to four years for a bachelor’s degree and one to two years for a master’s degree programme)’ (Trombetta, n.d.). He indicates however that ‘further education and training for practising journalists is rare’ (op. cit.).

Some independent media associations established in the last decade compensate for the deficit in effective professional associations²⁰. These are deemed an authoritative source for media news, reports and surveys and include SKeyes Media, Club de la Presse, the Maharat Foundation, the Institute of Professional Journalists and the blog of Magda Abu-Fadil (former director of the Journalism Training Program at the American University of Beirut). Their aims are to ‘increase the professionalism of the media and to limit the effects of self- and government-imposed censorship (see Sciacchitano, 2015, p. 28).

¹⁷ Middle East and North Africa.

¹⁸ Out-of-home advertising (also known as outdoors advertising) includes messages on billboards, public transport vehicles, etc.

¹⁹ American University of Beirut (AUB); Université Saint-Joseph (USJ); Lebanese American University (LAU); and Notre Dame University (NDU).

²⁰ The syndicates or trade unions are argued to be ineffective.

4.2 TRADITIONAL MEDIA

4.2.1 Print

There are two national news agencies in Lebanon and three international news agencies that facilitate content in Arabic and are frequently quoted²¹. The Lebanese traditional print media (and traditional media with online presence) is eclectic²². According to the Fanack organization, ‘Lebanon has one of the highest ratios of private newspaper ownership in the Middle East, and therefore one of the most diverse print environments’ (Fanack, 2017). Accurate circulation statistics are claimed to be inaccurate, so we abstain from making any claims. Two independent sources list the following dailies as the largest in circulation (see Fanack, 2017; and Trombetta, n.d.):

Table 3 High-circulation newspapers in Lebanon

Name of daily	Year founded	Political/sectarian inclination
As-Safir (The Messenger)	1974	Shia Muslim
An-Nahar (The Day)	1933	Liberal
Al-Akhbar (The News)	2006	Pro-Hezbollah
Al-Balad (The Country)	2003	Sensationalist, commercial
L'Orient-Le Jour	1904/1897	Anti-Syrian stance
The Daily Star	1952	
Al-Mustaqbal (The Future)	1955	Pro-Saudi stance
Al-Anwar	1959	Independent, centrist
Al-Diyar	1988	Aligned with Syria and Hezbollah

4.2.2 Radio

With only one state-run radio station in Lebanon, the radioscape is dominated by privately owned radio stations. According to Jad Melki *et al.*, ‘only a handful have “class-A²³” licences that allow them to broadcast political content and news. Consistent with other Lebanese news media, radio news providers reflect the agendas of their political and sectarian affiliations’ (Melki, *et al.*, 2012, p. 25). The following class-A (or category I) licence radio stations as the most popular²⁴ (Northwestern University Qatar Survey, 2016 in Fanack, 2017), accounting for nearly 85% of the Lebanese population as listeners (Trombetta, n.d.):

²¹ See Appendix 1 for a list of news agencies.

²² See Appendix 2 for a non-exhaustive list of print and online media. For an updated overview of media licence holders, please consult the Lebanese Ministry of Information (<http://www.ministryinfo.gov.lb/>). Please note that at the time of writing listings were available in Arabic language only.

²³ Also referred to as category I licences.

²⁴ For a wider overview of radio stations in Lebanon please refer to our Appendix 3.

Table 4 Most popular radio stations in Lebanon

Name of radio station	Year founded	Audience exposure (at least once daily)	Political/sectarian inclination
Sawt El-Ghad	1997	19%	Affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement(FPM)
Sawt Lubnan	1975	17%	Lebanese Phalanges Party, the pro-Western Christian-Maronite party
Sawt Lubnan al-Hurr	1978	15%	Pro-Western Christian-Maronite 'Lebanese Forces' party
Sawt al-Mada	2009	10%	Affiliated with the FPM
Radio Orient	1995	9%	Affiliated with the Future Movement

We looked for community radios in Lebanon, and came across with just one radio station defining itself as community radio, Radio Sevan, broadcasting music and cultural content for and on behalf of the Armenian community in Lebanon²⁵. The fact that our search (in English and in French) in the online domain failed to render further results does not necessarily mean that Radio Sevan is the sole community radio station in Lebanon, but it could indicate a scarcity of community radios or, we wondered, a gap.

Radio Beirut²⁶, which we visited during our field trip in Lebanon, can be argued to serve some sort of community role since their artists are engaged in public service in their communities such as mine clearance or youth engagement (sports). There are several definitions for community radio, amongst which, 'radio in the community, for the community, about the community and by the community' (TAMBULLI, Communication Project, Philippines, in AMARC, n.d.). This definition portrays community radio as fulfilling a public service role though, arguably, it would make a poor C4D candidate in this context. Indeed, a couple of sources (amongst which UNICEF Lebanon themselves) indicated that radio is the least used media channel in this region.

4.2.3 Film and television

4.2.3.1 The small screen

Cable and television are commonplace in Lebanon²⁷. The majority of the population is reported to have access to foreign channels, though 'local channels catering to specific sects and political interests continue to attract the highest viewership' (Fanack, 2017). Lorenzo Trombetta argues that there is 'a general lack of professional standards in reporting local, regional and international events, while the news agenda is deeply influenced by the different affiliations' (Trombetta, n.d.).

Following a 2016 survey by IPSOS & Nielsen released recently, television has a penetration of 92% (3.59 million TV users). According to this organization, 2016 accounted for 'the highest viewership registered in Lebanon ever' (Eurodata TV, in IPSOS & Nielsen, 2016, p. 27). The organization reports the peak viewing time at 9.30 PM, which coincides with the airing time of newscasts and political talk shows (see Melki, *et al.*, 2012, p. 22). Table 5 summarizes the results of

²⁵ See <http://www.radiosevan.com/> (accessed 18 April 2017).

²⁶ See <http://www.radiobeirut.net/> (accessed 18 April 2017).

²⁷ See Appendix 4 for an overview of television channels in Lebanon.

two different surveys, whose results roughly confirm the positions of the six favourite TV channels in Lebanon:

Table 5 Most watched TV channels (general)

TV channel	Year founded	Share of audience (IPSOS & Nielssen, 2016, p. 35)	Political/sectarian inclination	Percentage of respondents who identify this channel as favourite (Dubai Press Club, Arab Media Outlook Survey 2009-2013 in Fanack, 2017)
LBCi	1985	14.8%	Pro-Western	62%
MTV	1991	10.3%		26%
Al-Jadeed	1991	10.2%	Anti-Amal and anti-Hezbollah	54%
OTV	2007	3%	Affiliated with the Lebanese president, Christian Maronite Michel Aoun, and his Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)	39%
Future TV	1993	1.5%	Sunni Muslim community	27%
Al-Manar TV	1991	1.2%	Pro-Hezbollah	25%

News broadcasting has been criticized for their lack of public service, particularly in that they mostly centre on 'political content, particularly the activities and announcements of local and regional politicians. Newscasts offer little airtime to non-political news and often ignore social, lifestyle, and public interest news, including stories about crime, domestic violence, sectarianism, electricity shortages, and inflation (Melki, *et al.*, 2012, p. 23).

4.2.3.2 The big screen

The film industry in Lebanon, which spans over 30 years, should be understood in its pre-Civil War, Civil War, and post-Civil War contexts. Before the war, Lebanon is claimed to have been 'slowly building a reputation as a cinema center in the Arab world, rivaled only by Egypt. This privilege would end with the war, and Lebanese cinema was transformed from an industry to a collection of films made by disparate filmmakers working independently' (Khatib, 2008, p. 21).

The topic of civil war occupies a central role in public memory artistic expressions, including the big screen. During the civil war period the Lebanese film industry suffered from brain drain, lack of access to quality filming equipment, closure of studios and theatres, censorship, and decreased funding. Despite this dismal scenario, the country is said to have 'started seeing some attempts at showcasing film in the public arena [in 1995]... with an exhibition titled *Image of the Self, Image of the Other*' (Khatib, 2008, p. 28). In 1997, the critic George Ki'di is said to have pointed out the crux of the matter, stating that 'we are continuing with no national cinema, and therefore with no memory, no image, no presence' (Ki'di, 1991a [Arabic], in Khatib, 2008, p. 29). The Lebanese film industry is said to have entered a renaissance period in 1998 with films like *West Beyrouth*, *Beirut Phantoms*, and *Around the Pink House* (see Khatib, 2008, p. 30).

Lebanese film, as a product of its social environment, is still haunted by the Civil War, although it 'has also extended its subject matter to confront social taboos' (Khatib, 2008, p. 31). In the absence of the apparent lack of public service in television, it appears that film has started to fill in this gap. Table 6 provides a few examples of films that have been made to serve this purpose.

Table 6 Post-war Lebanese film targeting social taboos

Year	Title	Director	Genre	Topic
1998	<i>The civilized</i>	Randa Chahal	Drama	Racism
2001	<i>Lamma hikyit Maryam (When Maryam Spoke Out)</i>	Assad Fouladkar	Drama	Pressure on women to marry
2005	<i>Bosta</i>	Ziad Doueriri	Musical, War	LGBT
2007	<i>Sekkar barat (Caramel)</i>	Nadine Labaki	Fiction	LGBT
2010	<i>Rsasa taycheh (Stray Bullet)</i>	Georges Hachem	Drama	Pressure on women to marry
2011	<i>Et maintenant on va où? (Where do we go now?)</i>	Nadine Labaki	Comedy, Drama	Religious tensions
2013	<i>Mirath (Heritage)</i>	Philippe Aractingi	Biography, Drama	Migration
2013	<i>Habeth Loulou</i>	Layal M. Rajha	Comedy, Drama	Class divisions
2016	<i>Makhdoumin</i>	Maher Abi Samra	Documentary	Migrant labour / Modern slavery
2017	<i>Nour</i>	Sophie Boutros	Drama, Romance	Early marriage

The role of the government in supporting the film industry in Lebanon is said to be weak. A cinema section exists at the Ministry of Culture²⁸, though it is claimed that this is 'limited to making promotional touristic videos' (Khatib, 2008, p. 32). Lebanon is bound by two international instruments appertaining copyrights: the Berne Convention on literary and artistic works (since 1947) and the WIPO Convention (since December 1986). Filming and other related permits are issued by the General Security (see Fondation Liban Cinema, 2015).

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Fondation Liban Cinema reports that 'the film industry in Lebanon has seen a significant growth over the last four years, with 31 movies produced in 2014, compared to just four 10 years ago' (Fondation Liban Cinema, 2015). According to this organization, the most commonly produced film genre for the 2004-2015 period was fiction (56%), followed by documentary (42%). A growing film industry comes paired with festivals to ensure that locally-produced films are promoted, and whose details we list in Table 7.

Table 7 Lebanese Film Festivals (in Lebanon)

Name	When created	Where held	When held	URL
Beirut International Film Festival	1997	Beirut	Annually, October	http://www.beirutfilmfestival.org/
Ayyam Beirut Al Cinema'iya (Beirut Cinema Days) Film Festival	1999	Beirut	Biennially, March	http://www.beirutdc.org/
Cabriolet Film Festival	2009	Beirut	Annually, May	http://www.cabrioletfilmfestival.com/
The Lebanese Film Festival	2001	Beirut	June	http://www.lebanesefilmfestival.org/
Tripoli Film Festival	2014	Tripoli	May	http://www.tripoli-filmfestival.org/

²⁸ See culture.gov.lb/ar/Home (in Arabic) (accessed 5 May 2017).

4.3 TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Lebanon has three telecommunications providers: Alfa, Ogero Telecomm and MTC Touch. According to Lorenzo Trombetta, 'it is widely recognized that the mobile service is one of the most expensive in the region and falls short of modern standards. Moreover, calls can be easily tapped and traced for security reasons, not unimportant in such a volatile country' (Trombetta, n.d.).

IPSOS & Nielsen report a smartphone penetration of 2.53 million (80% of the population) and an Internet penetration of 2.40 million users (76% of the population) for 2016 (IPSOS & Nielsen, 2017, pp. 20-21). This figure is at odds with that registered by World Bank the preceding year: a mobile cellular subscription rate of 90% for the Lebanese (see Figure 2), although this difference can be explained by the fact that not every cellular phone is a smartphone. The figure for Internet users reported by IPSOS & Nielsen concurs with that registered by the World Bank (see Figure 3). It can also be appreciated from Figures 2 and 3 that the Lebanese, compared with their Syrian counterparts (in Syria) use mobile telephony and Internet more broadly.




Figure 2 Mobile cellular subscriptions Lebanon and Syria 2015 (World Bank, 2017)




Figure 3 Individuals using the Internet (% of population) Lebanon and Syria 2015 (World Bank, 2017)

4.4 DIGITAL MEDIA

2016 saw a social media penetration of 2.31 million users (96% of the Lebanese population) (IPSOS & Nielsen, 2016, p. 22). Social media platforms are reportedly used 'as a means of collective activism' (Fanack, 2017), although digital activists face a plethora of issues, including 'poor Internet speeds, access to resources, privacy issues, lack of skilled personnel, general lack of legislation and government support, issues surrounding the sectarian system, and censorship²⁹' (Melki, *et al.*, 2012, p. 7). According to the Fanack organization, 'Freedom House estimates that 50 websites were blocked in Lebanon in 2015, the majority of which were Israeli websites or contained content relating to pornography, prostitution or gambling. Online news websites are generally permitted to operate

²⁹ The issue of censorship in Lebanon is pervasive and the Virtual Museum of Censorship (see www.censorshiplebanon.org, accessed 7 May 2017) reports on media (both in print and online) that have encountered censorship.

without censorship, although the government occasionally issues content removal requests, typically citing defamation law' (Fanack, 2017).

In respect of social media platforms popularity, a word of caution should be issued. Multilingual users in the Arab world, and particularly in Lebanon, tend to post their entries in several languages (e.g. Arabic, English and French), with the result that 'the same user may be accounted for more than once while calculating the breakdowns of Facebook users per language' (TNS, 2015, p. 30). With that in mind, the Facebook language entries from Lebanon break down as follows: English 78%, Arabic 32% and French 10% (op. cit., p. 31).

Table 8 and Figure 4 summarize the most 'popular' social media platforms penetration from two separate surveys in Lebanon in 2016, confirming WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube at the top of the chain:

Table 8 Most popular social media platforms in Lebanon 2015 (Northwestern University Qatar Survey, Media Use in the Middle East, 2016, in Fanack, 2017)

Application	Popularity
WhatsApp	98%
Facebook	82%
YouTube	67%
Facebook Messenger	46%
Viber	46%
Instagram	22%
Google Chat/Hangouts	22%
Twitter	17%




Figure 4 Social media platforms penetration Lebanon 2015 (TNS, 2015, p. 4)

Replicating the model for television channel preferences, 'although the five most popular websites in Lebanon are not local... Lebanese audiences tend to visit local websites for news' (Melki, et al., 2012, p. 21). The list is constantly changing, but Table 9 confirms Melki's comment. At the time of writing, four of the top ten Lebanese websites were Yasour.org; Bintjbeil.org; Greenarea.me; and Saidaonline.com. Of the remaining six sites, only one provides content (Wikipedia.org). Two are browsers (Google.com.lb; and Google.com), and three are platforms (YouTube.com; Facebook.com; and Live.com).

Table 9 Popular websites in Lebanon at 8 May 2017 (Alexa, 2017)

Site	Daily Time on Site	Daily Pageviews per Visitor	% of Traffic From Search	Total Sites Linking In
1 Google.com.lb	7:27	6.12	0.50%	506
2 Youtube.com User-submitted videos with rating, comments, and contests.	9:15	5.34	9.00%	2,162,790
3 Google.com Enables users to search the world's information, including webpages, images, and videos. Offers... More	8:33	8.31	2.40%	2,777,412
4 Facebook.com A social utility that connects people, to keep up with friends, upload photos, share links and ... More	11:37	4.38	5.50%	6,532,428
5 Yasour.org NEWS ABOUT TYRE CITY	5:27	3.40	8.50%	433
6 Live.com Search engine from Microsoft.	4:12	3.25	6.10%	39,230
7 Bingbeil.org بيت بيزيل - عروسه الجليل - لبنان	4:00	2.44	3.50%	340
8 Greenarea.me موقع متخصص في شؤون ومضايا البيئة	4:18	2.60	32.90%	322
9 Wikipedia.org A free encyclopedia built collaboratively using wiki software. (Creative Commons Attribution-Sh... More	4:23	3.34	41.40%	1,208,313
10 Saidaonline.com مواقع إخبارية مستقل متخصص بشؤون لبنان بوجه عام ومدينة صيدا بوجه خاص يقدم الموقع مع... تغطية من المس	5:08	3.82	9.40%	605

Lastly, we extracted statistical data about popular social media platforms from the Arab Social Media Influencers Summit 2015 and compared Lebanon and Syria against the median for the Arab World. As can be seen from Figure 5, WhatsApp and Facebook dominate the scene. With the exception of Facebook (which appears more widely embraced in Syria), Lebanon appears to spearhead social media adoption in the region.




Figure 5 Social media platforms penetration (Lebanon/Syria comparison, March 2014)
(Prepared with data from TNS, 2015, pp. 20-50)

4.4.1 The blogosphere

Lebanon's multitude of traditional media outlets also seem to be mirrored in its thriving and active blog culture. Lebaneseblogs.com, an aggregator site for the top blog posts in Lebanon, offers readers and visitors the opportunity to search for more than 100,000 blog posts, many which are about Lebanon. Another aggregator site, 2Famous.TV compiled a list in 2012 of the top 100 Lebanese blogs after ranking more than 700 blogs, revealed that the top blogs are dominated by political commentaries and activism, which is perhaps not surprising, given the sectarian political climate of the country (see 2Famous.TV, n.d.). Despite this, digital media does not guarantee freedom of expression in Lebanon, as arrests have been made on those who voiced their political opinions on blogs and social media (see SMEX, 2017). Interestingly, blogs based on teenage issues are largely absent from the Lebanese blogosphere, perhaps because social media platforms are so strongly used by the younger generation as sources of information and communication in Lebanon.

4.5 THE ARTS AS A FORM OF INTROSPECTION, REPRESENTATION AND... COMMUNICATION

Film, as an artistic genre, often makes its way into media landscapes. This raises the question of whether other forms of artistic expression should be examined. In this section, we claim that all artistic forms constitute a means of personal and collective introspection and interrogation; as such, they constitute a mode of communication that paves the way to social change. Consequently, although the arts do not technically belong under a media landscape, we deemed them worthy of consideration. While an exhaustive arts landscape is beyond the purview of this project, we would nonetheless like to examine the main themes underlying current artistic production in Lebanon and, as will be seen, beyond. For a list of major cultural events in Lebanon please refer to Appendix 5.

It has been argued that ‘documenting, fictionalizing, photographing, and archiving are all current aesthetic practices being undertaken in response to the aftermath (and afterlives) of the long and bloody civil conflicts that beset Lebanon from 1975 until the early 1990s’ (Launchbury, et al., 2014, p. 457). Along the same lines, the arts serve as a form of examination of social issues and social change and, in fact, be incorporated to C4D interventions. In truth, Lebanese artists ‘understand their role to be “cultural workers”, based on “the idealized vision of the artist as serving the people” (Chin *et al.*, 2000, p. 272). The creations of [these] artists emphasize the rhetoric of liberation, recuperation, visibility, voice, and consciousness-raising (see Kondo, 1997)’ (Abdelhady, 2007, p. 53).

4.5.1 The cultural turn

It can be claimed that the beginning of the 1990s were pivotal in many respects. In Lebanon, for example, ‘the end of the Cold War coincided with the end of the country’s civil war and the signing of the Taif Accords in 1989’ (Toukan, 2010, p. 126). The year 1991 saw the introduction of a piece of legislation for disarmament and amnesty³⁰ that effectively ‘pardoned almost all activity undertaken in the name of war’ (Launchbury *et al.*, 2014, p. 457). This law had a silencing effect, and in view of the volatile political situation, and it gave way to a sort of collective amnesia (see Launchbury *et al.*, 2014, p. 457; Hout, 2011, p. 331) at the institutional, political and commercial level. This situation was, however, not replicated at the artistic level. For Nour Sacranie, ‘the arts have been at the forefront of attempts challenging the omnipresent amnesia and denial that pervades Lebanese society, as practitioners have forced issues of memory and history –that have otherwise been stifled – to come to light’ (Sacranie, 2016, p. 4).

Not only did the east and west parts of Beirut open to one another, but also a few Lebanese artists that had sought refuge in exile returned to Lebanon. In addition to this, Lebanon has a large diasporic population in the West whose art is consumed both in their host communities and in Lebanon. Many Lebanese immigrant cultural workers ‘maintain an attachment to and an expression of their homelands. As “representatives” of Lebanese culture, many of these cultural workers participate in “translating” their homeland to the audience of their host societies. However, the specific cultural contexts of their host societies influence what these artists take to be the defining aspects of Lebanese culture’ (Abdelhady, 2007, p. 41), perhaps even challenging the culture of their homeland. Claire Launchbury *et al.* posit therefore that the end of the Civil War represented a creative turn for the Lebanese arts scene, constituting ‘an act of defiance in the face of abject destruction and a manifest of the indestructibility of human expression when faced with the extremes of torture, confinement, grief, and exile’ (Launchbury *et al.*, 2014, p. 458).

4.5.2 The arts as a field of inquiry: major themes

Lebanon in the 21st century is a country of contrasts. It is faced with a plurality of political and religious ideals, with a variety of cultures and languages, with a colonial past and a post-colonial present, with a large Lebanese diaspora and a large refugee population. It is, therefore, appropriate, to examine how Lebanese artists experience and express not only memories of the civil war, but also the phenomena of globalization, cosmopolitanism, modernity, and alterity. In fact, ‘the position of the contemporary art scene in Lebanon is especially precarious because it exists amidst a maze of identity politics and contested understandings of modernity and post-modernity, all constrained by implicitly conditional funding and all against a backdrop of neo-colonial tension’ (Toukan, 2010, p. 145).

³⁰ See for example <http://civilsociety-centre.org/content/amnesty-law> (accessed 17 May 2017).

4.5.2.1 War and violence

Artistic expression constitutes an active force in society, one that critiques it and that idealizes it. Therefore, in the wake of the unresolved civil war ‘a vibrant art movement emerged around a set of critical aesthetics aiming to identify and work through a post-war crisis of representation’ (Westmoreland, 2013, p. 720). Preoccupation for topics such as war and violence is evidenced in the cultural production of contemporary painters such as Zena Assi and Ayman Baalbaki, and visual artists such as Ali Dirani, Lamia Joreige, Zena El Khalil, Walid Raad and Akram Zaatari.

Civil war occupies a central position in literature as well: ‘the psychological internalization of armed conflict continues to prevail in post-war Lebanese literature’ (Hout, 2011, p. 332) which is present in the works of authors like Elias Houry, Ramy Zein, Hyam Yared, Rashid al-Daif, Hoda Barakat, Hanan al-Shaykh, and others. Their narrative ‘forms the heart of a major theoretical enquiry into the respective roles of memory and history’ (Launchbury *et al.*, 2014, p. 459). Dalia Abdelhady points out that challenging the public culture of amnesia ‘takes many forms but narrating personal experiences seems to be a dominant strategy’ (Abdelhady, 2007, p. 46).

Swiss ethnomusicologist Thomas Burkhalter found, after his research among musicians in Beirut, that reactions to ongoing violence and war in Lebanon are diverse and often contradictory. His definition of violence includes psychological and physical violence, as well as structural violence. According to him, ‘musicians respond to the extreme violence in the divided communities of Lebanon in two opposing ways. They either try to ignore it and to concentrate on music-making or they side with one group within the society and become involved in protest or propaganda’ (Burkhalter, 2011, p. 56). Examples of contemporary singers who have sided with humanitarian or political causes include Diana Haddad, Nancy Ajram and Assi El Helani. It is claimed that music offers an outlet for youth to vent out their frustrations (see Sayegh, 2016), with rap and hip-hop being fertile ground for this, according to one of our key interviewees.

4.5.2.2 The redefinition of ‘home’

The treatment of exile and the redefinition of ‘home’ is a major motif in Lebanese literature. Writers explore what it means to be Lebanese both at home and abroad, because the Lebanese literary scene is in fact located both at home and overseas (*mahjar* writing). According to Syrine Hout, ‘Rabih Alameddine, Jad el-Hage, Tony Hanania, Nada Awar Jarrar, Patricia Sarrafian Ward, Elias Abou Haidar, Dominique Eddé, Ghassan Fawaz, Hani Hammoud, Alexandre Najjar, and others, have produced post-war literature in and about exile, which dealt not only with the civil strife but with one of its most significant by-products: expatriation’ (Hout, 2005, p. 219). Location and identity in a globalized world bring about the question of modernity, and the way in which Lebanon stands in front of the West, the Middle East, the Arab world and, indeed, the international community. Furthermore, it is in our eyes noteworthy that the concept of diaspora is mostly treated outwardly, i.e., in relation to Lebanese who have emigrated and settled elsewhere. Lebanon as a host country or home to non-Lebanese communities is apparently not conferred the same degree of attention.

4.5.2.3 The conundrum of ‘identity’ and ‘conflict’ in the face of modernity

It could be argued that ‘Lebanon’s persistent grappling with numerous identities and multiple narratives means that cultural production and representation, whether for a local or global audience, inevitably become domains of contestation’ (Toukan, 2010, p. 124). According to Samira Aghacy, ‘modernity is inextricably bound to a secular view of life that is opposed to the religious and to a strong emphasis on individual rather than collective identity’ (Aghacy, 2006, p. 562). The author argues that ‘although modernity is a phenomenon not limited to the West in Arab society, it is a fact

that Western cultural norms such as attitudes to morality, sexuality, and women's liberation are seen by Lebanese writers as emanating from the West and as threatening to their cultural and religious sensibilities' (op. cit., p. 562). It is suitable to indicate thus, in this context, that modernity has juxtaposed the terms 'identity' and 'conflict', causing them to collide in a number of areas: 'the religious versus the other religious or the secular identity, then... the rural versus the urban identity, the national versus the foreign identity, and the feminine versus our patriarchal society and its norms' (Yared, 2001, p. 215).

4.5.2.4 Language as a marker of identity

In a country like Lebanon, 'languages are shaped within literature and how in turn literary texts use these languages to advance and promote complex political messages' (Hartman, 2014, p. 7). The issue with languages in Lebanon is complicated as well as contested among critics.

Whereas it may be true that 'Lebanese writers regard a foreign language as a means of interaction and communication, [and that] they also perceive it as a threat to one's identity and the authentic way of living' (Aghacy, 2006, p. 565), the Lebanese diaspora has indeed produced anglophone and francophone Lebanese writers during the past decade. A few *mahjar* writers produce proficiently in two languages, such as Etel Adnan (English and French) and Jad el-Hage (Arabic and English). Many of their characters are 'torn between cultures, showcasing what Edward Said called "contrapuntal consciousness", i.e., the inevitable double or plural visions due to awareness of two or more cultures' (Hout, 2011, p. 334).

4.6 INFORMAL AND INTERPERSONAL CHANNELS

At least two of our key expert interviews highlighted the importance of interpersonal communication to us. 'We are Arabs,' we were told, and they left it at that. We ask what it means 'to be Arab' in communication patterns terms, and what are the values that matter.

It appears that 'the use of off-line areas and oral communication is consistent with Arab communication cultures. Oral communication has a striking advantage of creating the resource of trust, necessary for collective action' (Rinke & Roder, 2011, in Aslan, 2015, p. 2519). Commenting on Turkish reporter Hediye Levent working in Damascus, the author gives an example of the relevance of interpersonal channels: 'The best news source was people themselves; you could hear what happened in Aleppo on that day from a taxi driver in Damascus, the communication network was that developed' (Aslan, 2015, p. 2517). However, in oppressive regimes practising surveillance and censorship, a practical reason why interpersonal communication may be preferred under certain circumstances may be also explained in terms of personal security. 'In a culture of fear,' it could be argued, 'citizens prefer[red] these conventional, secure methods' (Aslan, 2015, p. 2518).

When studying Arab communication patterns, two of the basic values that are frequently mentioned by authors, include collectivism and hospitality. In fact, 'the influence of Bedouin values remains strong, despite the fact that around 90% of the population in the region presently resides in villages or cities' (Patai, 1983, in Feghali, 1997, p. 352). 'Collectivism' is an approach to life, in which social life is 'characterized by "situation-centeredness"' (op. cit., p. 352). Collectivism, communal cohesion, mutual interdependence, are terms to describe a value that shapes social communication patterns in the family, in the community and even in business. 'Hospitality,' an Arab trait that stands out to foreigners, 'predates the *zakaat*, the Muslim duty of giving 2.5% of one's wealth to the poor'

(Feghali, 1997, p. 353), and that finds elaborate displays during special occasions such as weddings, Ramadan, and burials.

4.7 REPRESENTATION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANESE MEDIA

One of our key expert interviewees was of the opinion that one of the taboo media topics is that of refugees. Far from that, we found, ‘the Middle East or more specifically the Arab world has different rules when it comes to refugees’ (El-Behairy, 2016). The author summarizes her findings about the representation of Syrian refugees in Lebanese media as follows:

A content analysis of the coverage of Syrian refugees in the two biggest Lebanese newspapers, An-Nahar and As-Safir, reveals many similarities to how this group is represented in western countries. Refugees were routinely referred to as a threat and a burden in Lebanese media. At the same time, they were left voiceless as journalists rarely interviewed them, opting instead to depict them as masses, as statistics, and in terms of costs (El-Behairy, 2016).

According to Yazan al-Saadi, the Lebanese media tends to victimize Syrian refugees, thereby rendering this group ‘apolitical, homogeneous, incapable of comprehending complexities, and utterly vacant of any agency or power’ (al-Saadi, 2015). Since we do not speak any Arabic, we are unable to conduct an analysis on Arabic newspaper sources, so we rely on the essential findings of a report prepared by George Sakada, Jocelyne Nader and Tony Mikhael in 2015 on behalf of UNDP. According to these authors, 75% of the media coverage (print, TV, radio and online) dedicated to ‘refugees’ is about Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Figure 6 portrays the topics on the discussion table:




Figure 6 Representation of Syrian refugees in the Lebanese media: topics (Sakada, et al., 2015, p. 9)

They found that the tone of the articles they analysed was generally neutral (49%), but among the remaining articles the negative category (27%) was slightly higher than the positive one (24%). Psychologically, it can be claimed that the positive-negative asymmetry is reflected in the media sphere in that negative news criminalizing refugees as a group and portraying them as a threat to national security can potentially receive more attention and have more impact on the population than positive news. Periodic inflammatory media rhetoric forms public opinion and can be used to justify discriminatory attitudes towards refugees. Sakada *et al.* attribute the negative tone of some articles to the fact that 'media broadcasts new reports the way they receive them from the security sources, without working on reformulating them in a way that avoids the negative implications contained therein' (Sakada, *et al.*, 2015, p. 11). El-Beahiry points out that the representation of Syrian refugees by the Lebanese media can be summed up by three main themes:

- (a) Some depict the Syrian refugees as 'stealing jobs, increasing government spending, and pushing Lebanese people into poverty';
- (b) Some assert that the refugees will cause the collapse of Lebanon. Syrians are seen to be 'tilting the demographic and confessional balance in the country, where the political situation is highly reliant on sectarianism';
- (c) Some claim that the Syrian refugees take advantage of the aid offered by international organizations. Syrians are 'therefore accused of straining the economy and depleting resources' (El-Beahiry, 2016).

4.7.1 Representation of Syrian Women in Lebanese Media

According to a study conducted by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom on the representation of refugee women from Syria in the Lebanese media from 2015 to 2016, it was found that the reports and the articles mainly focused on the women as victims of domestic violence or trafficking, and in situations as the traditional role of a caregiver under the patriarchal control of the household (ABAAD & WILPF, 2016, p. 8). Despite this, there was no mention of the women in relation of GBV in the media. This is problematic because Syrian women are either absent from the daily news, as they are often lumped together in the category of 'Syrian refugees' without any distinction to their gender, or they are portrayed in stereotypical, negative light (see ABAAD, 2016, p. 9). There are no stories told of them as individuals with a backstory, nor are there any follow-ups to the ones that are already reported. This kind of one-dimensional media reports of Syrian refugee women renders them voiceless and faceless, and portrays them as victims (carrying a certain political and social burden) in the perceptions of the host community. It was pointed out, however, that at least the Syrian women were not depicted as instigators of violence and terrorism, unlike their male counterparts (op. cit., p. 30). This notwithstanding, it should be borne in mind that in the face of harassment from within and outside their communities, women are portrayed differently. In fact, 'a culture of blaming women because of how she is dressed is common across many societies, Syrian and Palestinian societies are no exception. People tend to think that the reason for the attack must be due to the fact that the woman or girl was not covering up enough or was wearing make-up. This fails to recognise that abusers will select women and girls depending on their vulnerability not due to their appearance' (Rape Crisis, in Charles & Denman, 2013, p. 107).

The ABAAD study also concluded that due to the sectarian nature of media agencies in Lebanon, journalists often portray Syrian refugees, including women refugees, within the narrative that fits the interests or propaganda of the various news outlets (see ABAAD, 2016, p. 32). Because it can be surmised that these types of generalizations result in making Syrian refugees, especially

women refugees, more vulnerable and powerless than they already are, the study recommended a few initiatives that UN agencies and international NGOs operating in Lebanon can carry out to ameliorate the current situation (op. cit., p. 33):

- Create a media platform to tell stories of Syrian refugee women that are sensitive and informative, so that it can serve as a vehicle for awareness-raising on the social issues that affect Syrian refugee women in Lebanon;
- Train journalists, especially the younger generation of Lebanese journalists on how to report on issues of Syrian women in ways that depict them with more insight;
- Train Syrian women in leadership roles within their communities so that they can take up more active roles in the media reporting areas, or in relation to media outlets; and
- Work more closely with CSOs and media outlets to promote better communication with the refugee communities in terms of media reporting.

5 MEDIA CONSUMPTION HABITS AMONG SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

5.1.1 Our sources

We performed a grounded theory method (qualitative) analysis on the notes taken during the six interviews conducted in Beirut during week 12 and the two interviews that took place via Skype on 4th and 25th April 2017, respectively. In the interest of academic ethics, we assigned fictitious names to the interview participants to protect their identities and respect their privacy. We interviewed ten individuals, all resident in Lebanon during, eight separate interviews. The demographics are as follows: we interviewed five males and five females. Of our interviewees pool three individuals were Syrian, three Lebanese, and the nationality of the remaining four is unknown or 'other'. All the interviewees work with different aspects of Communication and Media (e.g. two in academia, seven for non-governmental organizations and one in the creative sector) and can be considered 'experts' in their respective fields. We feel that the information provided by the different interviewees concurs, i.e., that we reached saturation point at an early stage.

5.1.2 Analysis

We started the analysis by extracting the comments exclusively relevant to media channels, trust, integration, solidarity, messages, and ComDev initiatives. We worked inductively, reading our notes looking for categories (in abstract terms, e.g. 'trust', 'representation', 'social issues'), which we marked by means of open coding. We also added sub-categories (in more concrete terms, e.g. 'trust in institutions') and a field where we included our impressions on basic type of communication model (i.e. linear or dialogic), possible dependencies (e.g. access to a television set, level of literacy, sensitivity of the information that can potentially be distributed or shared through such channel, etc.). We included a properties column but we did not feel the need to use it as much. Table 10 illustrates the manner in which the information was prepared for the analysis.

Table 10 Example of grounded theory method analysis preparation

Statement	General category (abstract)	Specific category (concrete)	Subcategory	Properties (description)	Communication type (linear or dialogic)	Dependencies
<i>Drama can deliver social messages more subtly and get the discussion going (Ihmed).</i>	Channels	ComDev initiatives	Drama	--	Dialogic	This depends on how the play is performed (e.g. addressing the audience, or with a focus group at the end)
<i>Messages need to be put within context for visualisation. In agrarian communities, you 'plant your children separately like you plant your seeds spatially' (Mohammad).</i>	Messages	Arab social communication practices	Visualisation and contextualisation	--	--	Cultural and contextual knowledge
<i>Arab society is a patriarchal society. The family is key. Understanding the culture is essential to know what makes people tick and accept a message (Mohammad).</i>	Channels	Arab social communication practices	The family	Cohesive	Dialogic	Individuals remain at the mercy of their 'person of trust' (what to do if abuse comes from their 'person of trust?')
<i>For a lot of refugees, the first source of news is social media networks -not Twitter, but Facebook and WhatsApp (Natalie).</i>	Channels	Syrian refugees' media consumption habits	Social media	--	Dialogic	Mobile phones and Internet fees are said to be expensive in Lebanon
<i>The issue of fake news is an issue in the entire Middle East. A lot of journalists do not check their sources. A lot of fake news about Syria are being circulated in Lebanon. These news reflect attitudes towards Syrian in Lebanon (Natalie).</i>	Messages	Rumours (misinformation)	Source validity	--	Linear	--
<i>Another issue is the failure of the public service of the broadcasting media. The concept of public service does not exist in the media (Asma).</i>	Channels	Issues	Deficient or lacking public service of the broadcasting media	--	--	If the public media are not rendering public service, then the question is who is rendering public service?
<i>Syrians watch the same channels as the Lebanese. They watch a lot [of different channels] then take their own conclusions (Abdel & Sabah)</i>	Channels	Syrian refugees' media consumption habits	Television	Cohesive?	Linear	Not linear if watched in groups and discussed during and after

The main objective of these interviews was to find out which information and media channels Syrian refugees use and trust, particularly in the case of young people (age range 14-34 as defined by UNICEF Lebanon). The secondary objective was to detect knowledge about successful (potentially ComDev) interventions to address behavioural and social issues that we could consider and expand on during the second phase of our project.

5.1.3 Results and discussion

5.1.3.1 Which channels, which media?

Most of the discussion circled around ‘channels,’ which we summarize and comment on below. Note that traditional print media is not included as a category, as our interviewees tended to highlight the other channels.

5.1.3.2 Radio

Access to Syrian radio, Sham FM³¹, was also mentioned. Syrians’ access to radio is contingent on the same factors as access to television, despite the fact that a radio set is lower in cost and weight, i.e., it is more ‘portable.’ In both cases, it would be possible to open a dialogue by means of talk shows and focus groups, but we still think that some Syrians may abstain from participating out of repercussion concerns (see Di Giovanni, 2014, p. 6). Having said this, our concerns were minimized by our interviewee ‘Asma’ who proposed that ‘it is easier to work with youth.’

5.1.3.3 Television

They also watch mainstream Lebanese television channels such as LBCi, Future TV, New TV, Manar TV, and Al Shadir TV. Other TV channels mentioned were ‘Syrian TV’, as well as Al Arabyia, and Al Jazeera. We were informed that Syrian refugees in Lebanon check Syrian media and Syrian media produced in exile (e.g., in Turkey)³².

‘Asma’ lamented ‘the failure of the public service of the broadcasting media’ in Lebanon. This public service gap in Lebanon is currently being filled by the different sects and the non-governmental organizations working together with the ministries and civic organizations on the ground. Indeed, the broadcasting media reflects a social reality in Lebanon explained by Melani Cammett in the following terms:

Whereas in most postcolonial states in the Middle East, newly independent governments established robust public welfare infrastructure, an analogous system never fully emerged in Lebanon, thereby entrenching the role of non-state actors in social provision far more than in neighbouring countries. Sectarian providers therefore represent cultural forms that make ‘common sense’ to people (Rao & Walton, 2004, p. 8, in Cammett, 2015).

Our interviewees ‘Abdel & Sabah’ distinguished two TV series for their ability to start a discussion among youth in Lebanon despite mixed reviews among the audience: *Madame President* (Madam President, 2015) and *The Team* (The Team / الفريق (Al Fareeq), 2014). The former encouraged discussion around women’s roles and women in politics, whereas the latter uses football and team work as a tool to break down barriers and promote good neighbourly relations. From a ComDev perspective, we think adding an element of participation (e.g. focus groups) turns a typically diffusion communication model such as television into a participatory one. We are however concerned that Syrian refugees, especially those living in remote areas or in abject poverty, may have more restrictive access to television, which would be contingent to their having access to a television set, or

³¹ See <http://shamfm.fm> (accessed 25 April 2017).

³² No names were given.

even electricity supply (see Di Giovanni, 2014, p. 7; Di Giovanni, *et al.*, 2013, p. 15). In fact, one of our key interviewees indicated that we should consider two categories of Syrian refugees: 'those who can afford to live in houses, and watch television, and those who live in camps and do not always have access to television or newspapers. They may gather to watch television at a central location, for example, at the house of the chief of the camp' ('Natalie', 2017).

5.1.3.4 Social media

Three of our key interviewees shared with us that Syrian refugees, in particular Syrian youth, are keen social media users (namely Facebook and WhatsApp). 'Natalie' shared that literacy may be an issue among some adults, and that 'children tell their parents what is going on in the news' ('Natalie', 2017). In respect of individuals with literacy issues, we were told that WhatsApp has a voice note messaging functionality that can be used in lieu of typing messages.

5.1.3.5 Interpersonal channels

'Mohammed' pointed out the relevance of folk media (in his words, the *hakawali*, or village story teller) at the coffee houses where women gather every morning. The mosque constitutes another public space where information is shared. He also relayed the importance of the family as a key cohesive unit in Arab societies. As such, interpersonal communication channels are effective and social capital may be the norm as a coping mechanism; however, we would like to comment on the risks that overreliance on human capital may entail. It has been suggested that the individual is left at the mercy of their 'person of trust' and the individual may not be willing to come forward and report issues or incidences of abuse, in particular if these involve their 'person of trust' (see Di Giovanni, 2014, p. 10). Furthermore, it is difficult to stop rumours that are started and circulated through the grapevine.

5.1.3.6 Who do Syrian refugees trust? Whose information do they trust?

This is a topic seven of our interviewees ventured answers on. For all seven of them, trust is vested on people (as opposed to institutions), particularly people from the family circle³³, from their community, and from individuals with similar sectarian, religious, or political views. Local institutions appeared to be preferred to international or foreign institutions. The media came last, with interviewees confiding that they read different media to then come to their own conclusions. In short, when the message is delivered by 'one of us/one like us' then it is likely to be more accepted. We were warned, moreover, about media literacy issues: 'A lot of journalists do not check their sources. A lot of fake news about Syria are being circulated in Lebanon' ('Natalie', 2017). If sources are not accurate, it does not matter how many of them are consulted (the output can never be better than the input). We conclude that there is an opportunity for media literacy and source criticism training among the wider public³⁴.

In terms of institutions, we were told that 'local NGOs are more trusted than international NGOs, in particular with sensitive health or social issues' ('Ihmed', 2017). Similarly, we were told that the Lebanese are perceived as more 'liberal' so their messages may be viewed with a pinch of suspicion by Syrians.

³³ Note: we learned that the concept of 'family circle' in Arab terms roughly corresponds to a Western family's extended family circle.

³⁴ We argue that this issue is not exclusive to Lebanon and Syria. A debate article published in the Swedish media alerts about the lack of source criticism among Swedish students and highlights the school's important role in fostering media and information literacy (see Halápi, *et al.*, 2017, *in Swedish*).

'Natalie,' who lived in one of the largest refugee camps in Lebanon for a month, pointed out that there is a lack of storytellers from within the Syrian community. They will not speak for themselves and 'they are a bit resistant when speaking to the media' ('Natalie', 2017). This has to do with 'trust' and whom they would trust their stories to, as they do not want their names revealed or their feelings exposed. To illustrate the issue, we touched upon the topic of sexual harassment:

Us: *Is there sexual harassment from the Lebanese community towards Syrian refugees?*

Natalie: *Some Syrian women who are unable to find work may resort into sex work, which incites sexual harassment and makes them vulnerable. There is no law [in Lebanon] that protects against sexual harassment, and Lebanese society is not aware of what constitutes sexual harassment. This applies equally to the Lebanese and the Syrian. Sexual harassment goes underreported or is not reported if it does happen.*

Us: *But if a sexual harassment incident does get reported, how is it reported?*

Natalie:

Us: *The police?*

Natalie: *No, never.*

Us: *A civil society organization?*

Natalie: *Perhaps. The NGO sends a lawyer with the woman to the police station. The woman will not go herself to the police. NGOs act as mediators.*

Us: *Do sexual harassment incidents get reported to the head of the camp?*

Natalie: *No. It is a 'shame' to be harassed and women are 'blamed' for being harassed. Minor sexual acts are not considered sexual harassment so they go unreported due to unawareness.*

5.1.3.7 Other communication strategies to consider

It was suggested to us that the provision of information should be paired with the delivery of services ('Ihmed', 2017). For example, UNHCR has waiting centres where audio-visual information can be displayed on television screens and leaflets can be distributed. Whereas we do not object to this form of information dissemination, the following comments arise from a ComDev perspective. Many of the topics that try to deal with behavioural and social change are sensitive in nature. It may be appropriate to distribute residency information via these channels, but the same may not be true for topics such as domestic violence. Furthermore, unregistered refugees may not approach UNHCR centres, being more reliant on interpersonal communication methods (see Di Giovanni, *et al.*, 2013, pp. 4-5; Di Giovanni, 2014, p. 5). So, at the risk of initiating 'rumours', word-of-mouth may be paradoxically a more effective means of communicating certain types of information. Moreover, the distribution of leaflets may leave illiterate individuals out unless the leaflets include pictures or pictorials –again, a challenging task when it comes to illustrating bullying, depression, or domestic violence, without hurting sensitivities.

In the case of remote areas, it was suggested that mobile communication hubs were being used. We think this is a good initiative with the potential to instigate dialogue, but its effectiveness is contingent on a number of factors, such as frequency of visits, levels of privacy afforded and whether the refugee is able to confide concerns, issues and needs to the same person every time. Some non-governmental organizations such as Relief International are said to have a communication hub in the Bekaa valley, staffed with employees to answer questions ('Ihmed', 2017).

The dissemination of information through meeting spaces such as mosques (e.g. ‘Mohammad’ mentioned mosques had been successfully used in the past for the promotion of family planning). The importance of interpersonal communication channels was in fact highlighted during the interviews with ‘Mohammad’ and ‘Abdel & Sabah’. ‘Abdel’ warned, however, that interpersonal channels may also function as an ‘echo chamber’, that is, leaving no room for the exchange of opinions or different points of view. In this respect, ‘Ihmed’ pointed out to us that circumstances may change rapidly, rendering content invalid or obsolete. ‘Natalie’ pointed out that she works for a publication that intends to give voice to refugee women by publishing their narratives in a dedicated column³⁵.

5.1.3.8 Which activities are best to encourage peaceful coexistence?

It was suggested that some activities linked to the arts, music and sports may be suitable to bring the host and the refugees communities together. This, in our view, is contingent on the availability of a shared space and, where applicable, of instruments, tools, clothing, and/or other gear. Sports was singled out as particularly suitable by virtue of it being ‘a physical activity that people really need; it is interactive and cooperative. Music can be political’ (‘Fahd’, 2017).

A successful ComDev activity that was recommended in three of the interviews we conducted (with ‘Ihmed’, ‘Mohammed’ and ‘Abdel & Sabah’) was that of film or drama, which has the potential to ‘deliver messages more subtly and get the discussion going’ as well as talk shows, especially those featuring focus groups, on television and radio.

5.1.3.9 Conclusions from the interviews

From our analysis, we theorize that dialogic or participatory communication models generate more trust than linear (dissemination, mass communication) models, and that interpersonal channels have precedence over institutional or commercial channels. It may even be fair to state that in sectarian societies it is the ability to empathize with ‘similar others’ that generates trust. The issue in sectarian societies is that groups’ members seem to dialogue among themselves, perpetuating their ideas and attitudes. Bearing in mind the 1972 McCombs & Shaw agenda-setting model, the public will be encouraged to discuss the topics that the media puts on the table (see for example McQuail, 1977[1979], p. 16; Atkin & Rice, 2012, p. 7) –and nothing else.

In light of the information received from our sources, challenging attitudes, misinformation and rumours could, albeit partially, be combated by opening a wider window for dialogue and interaction among social groups (sects), fostering media literacy and source criticism training initiatives, and finding a way for the socially marginalized to represent themselves. These initiatives should target the population at large, and would be beneficial for everyone, including the refugee populations. As for refugees, literacy issues can potentially be circumvented, but the situation of refugees living in camps remains dire and some of the solutions may be first contingent on financial aid and social circumstances (e.g. to prevent child labour and promote schooling) before we can start considering communication interventions.

³⁵ We were informed that the new website, featuring a ‘Stories’ section, was to be launched by the end of May to mid-June 2017. At the time of writing the website was not operational yet (see gabmediacenter.org). The GAB Media Center is an initiative of AFE – Arab Foundation for Freedoms and Equality (see <http://afemena.org/about-us/>, accessed 27 April 2017).

6 C4D RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

Heeding the objective of our study, namely to put forward C4D recommendations to help organizations like UNICEF combat the situation for Syrian refugee children and youth in Lebanon, who through displacement and re-settlement into the complex socio-political landscape of this country may be at risk of becoming a lost generation, we now introduce our C4D recommendations. Before we do so, we submit an analysis of what is visible of UNICEF's communication strategies, which, coupled with a summary of our findings, informs our recommendations.

The analysis was conducted at macro-, meso-, and micro level to appraise the various tiers, internal and external, where UNICEF may face opportunities and constraints.

6.1.1 At macro level (SWOT)

The matrix below highlights the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats UNICEF Lebanon should consider when managing interventions in the country.

Table 11 UNICEF SWOT analysis (highlights)

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNICEF Lebanon is part of an extended global organizational network; Long history – UNICEF has existed since 1948, and is therefore well-known locally and regionally; UNICEF works in partnership with the Ministry of Health and is a permanent member of the Higher Council of Children, under the auspices of the Minister of Social Affairs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Part of a larger, international bureaucratic framework - complex relationship with UNICEF Regional Office in Amman and UNICEF headquarters; No real direct access/relationship with Syrian refugees, as local NGO act as 'intermediary' in local service delivery; Funding is needed (i.e., not guaranteed) to carry out C4D recommendations.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A well-staffed C4D unit within UNICEF Lebanon; Communications Office with well-honed social media experience; Increased exposure from existing projects such as 'Imagine a School' and 'No Lost Generation' provide new visibility, hence a chance for wider outreach. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negative beliefs held by host community towards Syrian refugees in Lebanon; Increasing tension between Syrian refugee population and host community in Lebanon; General 'conflict fatigue' due to long-term and escalating conflicts in Syria and in the region, which could lead to apathy from host community.

UNICEF as part of a well-established, extended organizational network can (and does) benefit from collaboration with their partner organizations and the local administration. The C4D unit is quite recent: it was created 2-3 years ago and boasts a staff of five. The recency of the unit gives it certain amount of 'freedom to try out anything' ('Sylvie & Elias', 2017) within the framework of organizational rules and procedures. We were informed that the Communication and the ComDev departments function as two separate units, but that they co-operate in matters appertaining advocacy.

Work is carried out through a network of NGO and CSO partners, who are ‘on the ground and closer to the people’ (‘Leila’, 2017). If UNICEF Lebanon relies on others, they must have good mechanisms in place to gauge the effects of the work done on the ground. We were told that ‘different messages cater to different audiences. We conduct focus groups before, during, and after [the interventions]’ (‘Sylvie & Elias’, 2017).

Being part of a larger organization also means compliance with red tape, and working through NGO and CSO partners on the ground mean reduced contact with the target groups, highlighting UNICEF Lebanon’s role as a fund provider and strategic decision-maker. UNICEF Lebanon is faced with several challenges ahead, considering they are dealing with at least three separate target groups (the Lebanese, the Palestinian, and the Syrian). UNICEF Lebanon must deal with donor fatigue, owed to the protracted nature of the conflicts that created Syrian and Palestinian refugee populations in Lebanon; as well as increased hostility towards refugees within the host community, who may sometimes feel that their own interests are not being prioritized.

6.1.2 At meso level: the communication channels mix

The communication channels matrix below is based on media outlets listed on UNICEF Lebanon’s recent project named ‘Imagine a School’, which is one of the communication examples UNICEF shared with us during one of the interviews, and which we looked into. The #ImagineaSchool project runs under the umbrella of the No Lost Generation initiative³⁶.

Table 12 UNICEF Lebanon’s communication channels mix

Social Media	Internet / Websites / Organizations	Television channels	Newspapers
Facebook Twitter Instagram Medium YouTube	AJ+ Playground Relief Web Yahoo Middle East Monitor (MEMO) Children of Syria (UNICEF’s dedicated website to issues of Syrian children) UNICEF’s Global Website UN Global Website UNIC (United Nations Information Centres)	LBC International Future Television Al Arabiya Al Jazeera BBC News	An-Nahar Lebanon Files The Daily Star L’Orient-Le Jour Reuters The Huffington Post

Social media is widely used by UNICEF Lebanon. According to information received from the Social Media Coordinator, their statistics show that:

- ✓ Facebook and Twitter appear to be the social media tools of choice. The fact that Twitter has a penetration of 17% in Lebanon (see Table 8) is indicative of UNICEF’s choice of the tool to reach out to an international rather than local audience;

³⁶ See <http://nolostgeneration.org/champions> (accessed 18 May 2017).

-
- ✓ UNICEF Lebanon’s Facebook page currently has 104,402 followers; of which 53% are men and 47% are women. 75% of the followers are between the ages of 18-34. English is most used (51,126 people) followed by Arabic (42,415) and French (4,806). About 40,000 of the followers are located in Lebanon, about 20,000 in Egypt, about 4,000 in Syria and 2,500 in Jordan.

However, the followers who engaged in sharing and commenting on the Facebook page show a slightly different picture: the main language of this group is Arabic, followed by English. 67% of men and only 34% of women are active, and out of those percentages, 37% of the men are between 18-24, and 13% between 25-34 whereas only 17% and 7% of women in the respective age groups were active.

- ✓ About 75% of their Twitter audience are English speakers and 38% are Arabic speakers, of which 60% are men and 40% are women. More than half of them are between the ages of 25 to 34 years old, and 16% and 21% in the age groups of 18-24 and 35-44 respectively. An overwhelming majority of the audience (90% and 85%) are interested in the ‘business and news’, and ‘politics’ categories. The countries with the highest concentrations of fans and active followers are Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan.

UNICEF Lebanon launched a new project called ‘Imagine a School’ on January 23rd 2017, which is made out of 18 short videos and photos telling the stories of the lives of Syrian children in Lebanon. The project highlights the plight of 187,000 school-aged Syrian children who are out of school and working in factories and living on the streets in Lebanon. The aim of the project is to raise USD 240 million for their education programmes in the country for 2017.

The videos received wide coverage on Facebook, and reported 28 million views in the first month alone. The ‘Imagine a School’ post was shared over 50 thousand times from UNICEF Lebanon’s Facebook page. #ImagineaSchool was also mentioned on Twitter in over a thousand different posts, multiplying in a potential outreach of 9.6 million users. One of the more popular videos features Fares, a young Syrian boy, was also widely shared on UNICEF’s main Instagram account which boasts 1.6 million followers and that video reported over 70 thousand views. The campaign appears to be in digital format only, thereby ‘reproducing the asymmetry of the digital divide in the distribution and use of new technologies’ (Chouliaraki, 2013, pp. 17-18).

The project also received 82 mentions in the media, both local and international (please refer to the list in the above matrix). In addition to this, the project was also publicized on media outlets like Aj+ and Playground (which generated considerable media attention) and on UNICEF’s own headquarters and country offices websites. It is hard to say whether the testimonials were produced by the children themselves, even if we get the impression that the filming was carried out by a media professional. The clips rely upon the classic ‘sad children, sad faces’ approach. This raises an important question about representation; namely, whether UNICEF is representing these children, or whether the organization is helping these children speak out on behalf of their group.

Although this project represents UNICEF Lebanon’s outward PR efforts rather than C4D approaches, it is noteworthy in the context of our own project because it provides some useful user statistics as well as loose guidelines as to the kinds of communication channels used by UNICEF Lebanon, thereby offering ideas of what we could use, for our own project in terms of activity launching.

6.1.3 Micro level: audiences and stakeholders

As we have chosen to focus on the prevention and elimination of certain actions such as bullying, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, and early marriage via activities that foster conviviality, the following target audience groups were identified:

Table 13 UNICEF Lebanon's audiences and stakeholders

Priority	Engage
Children (Syrian and Lebanese), 5-14 Youth (Syrian and Lebanese), 15-24 Girls and young women (Syrian), 15-24 Host community, the public at large	Local NGO Settlement leader/Community leaders Parents of Syrian children and youths Syrian refugee (adults)
Inform	Observe
Ministry of Health Ministry of Social Affairs Potential donors	Host community Other refugee groups

6.2 Discussion

Convincing the population to take a more positive stance towards Syrian refugees does not come without challenges if we consider the fact that Lebanon's commitment to assist refugees is moral rather than legal. The overarching argument should therefore be built upon basic human rights and children's rights rather than on refugee rights, since Lebanon is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 protocol.

The *habitus* model was not confirmed during our interviews. We recommend however a more encompassing study to describe Syrian refugees' media consumption habits at the hand of the *uses and gratification* model, to map out what the different media platforms are being used for.

Whereas many of our interviewees noted that the Lebanese and the Syrians obtain their information from a plurality of media sources to then form their own opinions, we have also pointed out that sectarian practices in the country are conducive to a diversity of self-perpetuating eco chambers rather than a plurality of voices in mainstream media. The self-perpetuation effect of the eco chambers may be owed to the fact that consumers tend to trust media sources that are in line with their own sectarian affiliation. We are for this reason hesitant to recommend one newspaper over another, or one TV channel over another. In their awareness-raising and advocacy efforts, and in the interest of neutrality, organizations such as UNICEF should be careful if possible to work with either all channels or with none of them. Working with just a selection of channels may give the outer impression of partisanship, even if unintended.

Periodic inflammatory media rhetoric about Syrian refugees (or refugees in general) and the current lack of self-representation of Syrian refugees, particularly women, in Lebanese media channels are far from helpful. We propose that negative attitudes can be the result of lack of direct contact between the Lebanese and the Syrian. For example, having two separate school shifts (one

for Lebanese children, and one for Syrian children³⁷) may help deliver different school curricula but is not conducive to interaction between the two communities. The situation is not helped by the mainstream media: we argue that one piece of news with negative tone has more effect (and does more damage) than ten pieces of news with neutral or positive tone. Lack of awareness can be lessened by exposure to lived experiences of civil and social citizenship, which can come from personal testimonies.

The above, in combination with the conclusion that interpersonal communication networks in the public sphere appear to be generally more effective in the dissemination of messages and have a greater potential to instigate change at the personal and social level, has steered our C4D recommendations away from reliance on mainstream media and towards the sports and the arts. We argue that the latter are not only channels for the expression of opinions and attitudes, but also of humanity, of a shared space and possibly of a shared destiny. They also constitute forums for interaction and collaboration and, in this sense, for building *communitas*. We discussed the concept of *communitas*, which can be built upon traits in common between the host population and the refugee groups, such as language, food, music, cultural heritage, arts and sports interests. Building *communitas* can foster solidarity, feelings of community and peaceful co-habitation. The arts, as a form of personal and collective introspection, can help reflect on the phenomenon of diaspora, which is not exclusive to the Lebanese who emigrated abroad during the civil war, but applies equally to other groups who have settled on Lebanese soil.

Pending further research, we submit therefore that interpersonal channels appear to be of prime importance, which places face-to-face interactions and interpersonal networking at the top of 'media channels to be trusted'. This does not necessarily mean that other channels should be discarded but, rather, that communication interventions should start at the interpersonal level, utilizing the available public spaces (such as schools, mosques, or any other suitable public spaces) to then be expanded from there. Interpersonal communication is highly valued and conforms to the trusted channel between groups and individuals to share information, so networks should be tapped to promote any activities and generate interest. The social-psychological model that deals with change via social networks such as Everett Rogers' Diffusion of Innovations theory posits that the adoption of a new idea/habit spreads through the interaction within social networks, and takes off when a critical mass is reached, made possible by a 'tipping point' (see Darnton, 2008b, p. 44). Identifying certain persons within a network that could be the drivers of social change, such as 'mavens' (those who share expert knowledge on a certain subject), 'connectors' (those who have a large network) and 'salesmen' (those who can pitch ideas well) (op. cit., p. 45), could be useful to propel the campaign forward.


Television is an important channel for the dissemination of information, as is out-of-house advertising such as billboards along roads. Using TV space for promotional ads would give widest coverage, though it is expensive. Out-of-house advertising is widely used in Lebanon, and may be a cheaper option for awareness-raising, but its impact is hard to measure. Young Lebanese and Syrians are users of social media platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook. These can be used to publicize events, solicit interest, and generate discussions.

We distinguished between behavioural (individual) and social (community) change, and return here to cognitive and cultural models, which complement one another and should inform the planning

³⁷ See for example <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2014/2/530b65326/second-shift-schools-offer-hope-young-syrians.html> (accessed 22 May 2017).

of a social change intervention. The different disciplines have distinct definitions for ‘cognitive’, but for our purposes we contrast these two models as summarized in Table 14:

Table 14 The cognitive model and the cultural model



We believe that those who are best-suited to answer the questions on Table 14 are members of the community (or target group). Therefore, we deem it essential to involve members of the community at the planning, implementation, and evaluation stages of a C4D intervention. After our interviews with UNICEF staff we were left with the impression that UNICEF’s strategic decisions are implemented on the ground by their partner organizations (e.g. local NGOs and civil organizations). An ‘organization’, for our purposes, will then need to be imagined as an enterprise, i.e., not as a single entity branded under one name, but rather in terms of a ‘collaboration between individual entities who consciously and intentionally focus on one or more goals’ (Barnard, 1938; Bruzelius & Skärvad, 2011, p. 27, in Larsson, 2014, p. 68, *our translation*). In this light, we recommend involving every player in the communication and decision-making chain at every stage of the intervention, as well as media specialists and artists.

Mainstream media have an important role to fulfil in that they foster (and perpetuate) certain attitudes among their audiences. Considering the dearth of capacity building for journalists outside academia, UNICEF Lebanon would do well in partnering with independent media associations or the universities in order to deliver workshops on how to report on refugees and, in particular, women refugees. Similarly, Syrian refugee women could be furnished with journalism and leadership skills, encouraging them to step forward and have their voices heard.

6.3 C4D RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the complex context of the Syrian refugee issues in Lebanon, with its long-shared history and the deeply entrenched and general negative emotions regarding Syrians by the host community, the most appropriate strategy to use is Communication for Change (C-Change) approaches. Social and Behaviour Change Communication’s (SBCC) principles, which are ‘empowering and horizontal; encourage communities to be agents of their own change; promote dialogue, debate and negotiation; ... and focus beyond but include individual behaviours, on social norms change, policies, and culture to unfold sustainable change in communities and among individuals’ (McKee et al, p.278); would deal not just with piecemeal initiatives targeting one area, but rather it encompasses a more holistic framework that addresses the community’s problems using participatory methods. We are mindful that the task at hand is complicated and likely requires a long process, however if the general context is not addressed, the aims of achieving a sustainable outcome might be compromised.

In order for social behaviour change to truly take root, both top-down and bottom-up initiatives would be needed –the success of grass roots efforts hinge upon the government’s buy-in, in terms of

social policies, public funding and the political commitment to the issue. According to the McKee model on SBCC (see Figure 7), there are three strategies working together in every successful campaign: It is necessary to have advocacy for policy change and resource mobilization, from getting the matter out onto media outlets to galvanizing the support of politicians; it draws on the strengths of social mobilization, via the cooperation with national organizations and community networks; and it uses BCC (Behaviour Change Communication) in terms of interpersonal and participatory approaches through the utilization of mass media and IT towards the changing of social behaviour (see McKee *et al.*, pp. 287-288).




Figure 7 Three key strategies of social behaviour change communication.
Source: adapted from McKee (1992). *C-Change Project*, 2011.

There is an obvious information deficit element in this case study to take into account, but the success of advocacy work depends on the audience's willingness and ability to transform the knowledge into motivation in relation to specific values that would spur action (see Samuel, 2010, p. 187). The crux of our communication campaign, which is to encourage and promote willingness towards a convivial culture in Lebanon, especially with young people, can be analyzed through the model of behaviour at the individual level, such as Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and Triandis' Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (TIB) from which social-psychological elements such as attitudes, norms, agency, habit, emotions and contextual factors are used to explain the public behaviour of the individual (see Darnton, 2008a, pp. 12-14). The host community can be steered towards developing more accepting attitudes towards the Syrian refugees when they perceive that their actions in adopting a more welcoming stance (agency), associates with a higher moral value (attitude), if it is seen in society as the common or right thing to do (norm) and/or because it will generate the feeling of compassion or solidarity with the Others (emotion). The above elements of attitude, norm and emotion combined with repeated agency will produce a new attitude, and in this case, a new way of understanding their Syrian counterparts and the corresponding situation.

A 'people-centred' advocacy approach that prioritizes creativity and interaction with socially mediated communications makes it difficult for the participants to remain unengaged (see Samuel, 2010, p. 190). As such, our recommendations are based on using the arts as an overarching theme in planning for some of the activities. We are inspired by ongoing work that uses the creative lens of performing and creative arts and cultural activities to promote awareness-raising on refugee experiences, such as Journeys Festival International³⁸, a two-week event where refugee voices are heard and shared through culture and art; Artscape³⁹, the international Street Art festival that started in Malmö in 2014 as an attempt to bring art to the public with large-scale Street Art installations by global artists and community art workshops; and online writing platforms such as Medium and social media applications like Instagram that have produced an outlet for essays, photographs and stories on the immigrant and refugee experiences. We are also inspired by new museum initiatives that endeavours to ease tension on migrant and refugee issues and promote inclusion such as the Migration Museum⁴⁰ in London and the still-work-in-progress ideas like the Museum of Democracy and Refugee in Malmö. Furthermore, the theme of using the arts kept coming up in our interviews with our informants for this project, highlighting it as a common avenue to express oneself as well as share information.

Our aim for recommending the following activities is based on the intention to create neutral spaces and opportunities for reflection, discussions and dialogue surrounding the refugee issues, and particularly on inventive and interesting ways of engaging the young people from both sides. Our research has also led us to the conclusion that due to media bias in Lebanon, refugees are not often portrayed as individuals with a genuine backstory. Therefore, our recommendations are to implement activities that we believe would present as platforms from which the refugees can tell their own stories. To capitalize on World Refugee Day (which falls on June 20th annually), activities can be planned as one-day event to take place on the day itself and as well as events leading up to the main day. The activities would ideally be a co-operation with national partners as well as local NGOs, to follow the SBCC principles discussed above.

The table below gathers our recommendations, which we have not tested. We leave the choice of evaluation approach (see section 3.1.3) to the discretion of the project team in charge of testing them. In the interest of sound C4D practices, we do recommend involving representatives of the target communities at every stage of the intervention (e.g., design, implementation and evaluation).

³⁸ See www.journeysfestival.com (accessed 22 May 2017).

³⁹ See <https://www.artscape.se/> (accessed 22 May 2017).

⁴⁰ See <http://www.migrationmuseum.org/> (accessed 22 May 2017).

Table 15 C4D recommendations

POSSIBLE TOPICS		WHAT	HOW	WHY	DID IT WORK?
BULLYING	✓	Drama or Theatre Play written by young people and performed by young people, on the issue of refugee and migration	The idea is a creative and shared experience for Syrian and Lebanese youths to come together to create a common cultural experience together.	The process of performing together will offer the youths an opportunity to connect with each other in non-judgmental and artistic ways that could lead to deeper insights. The product would represent a creation of both the groups, offering proof that there is hope in living together in harmony.	Feedback forms will be handed out to audiences directly after the play, perhaps in a kind of post-play reception or mingle event. One-on-one and focus group interviews with the performers and production team can be conducted at a later date to gather feedback.
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE	✓				
GBV	✓				
SEXUAL HARASSMENT	✓				
BULLYING		A youth orchestra or choir, made up of young people from both groups			
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE					
GBV					
SEXUAL HARASSMENT					
BULLYING		Art Workshop with children from both groups, finished art pieces will be display in an exhibition in a museum or gallery. Photos of the art piece can be taken for a digital exhibition on a website.	The workshop could explore a child's perspective on the issue, by asking the children to create an art piece that best represents their future, or their favourite place.	Presenting children's impressions as an exhibition on a sensitive topic would ease the tension around the subject of migration and refugees in Lebanon.	Visitors and participants of the exhibits/seminars will be given feedback forms to fill in after their visit/the event.
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE					
GBV					
SEXUAL HARASSMENT					
BULLYING		Seminars based on the children's art pieces	The public at large can glean further information on the topic, and create a wider distribution network.	To take the opportunity to discuss the issue of child protection and inclusion.	
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE					
GBV					
SEXUAL HARASSMENT					
BULLYING	✓	Instagram Stories Feature	Using the new Instagram feature where stories can be told by creating a 'living' photo essay –an account can be set up to showcase the stories of youth from both groups that feature different topics. One topic could be 'what's in your bag'. Submissions on what are items in an average teenager's bag and what they mean to them are then featured on the topic thread.	This is inspired by the International Rescue Committee's photo essay on Medium with the title 'What's in My Bag?' to showcase the refugee experience by asking them what they took with them when they fled their home countries. The essay has generated considerable interest by providing a human face to an otherwise mass incident.	The success of the activity can be measured by the amount of 'claps' (similar to 'likes') a story generates and the number of followers of the account and/or story.
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE	✓				
GBV	✓				
SEXUAL HARASSMENT	✓				

Table 16 C4D recommendations (continued)

POSSIBLE TOPICS		WHAT	HOW	WHY	DID IT WORK?
BULLYING	✓	Blog featuring columns by Syrian youths, with a special column focusing on girls and young women's experiences	Submissions for stories can be solicited through various channels, from schools, from local NGOs working with Syrian refugees, through social media, etc. The blog entries will also have comments sections so discussions or a debate can be held online.	This idea was inspired for the many examples we have heard regarding writing being a channel to express and share the refugee experience. It can serve as a catalyst for the producer, and the finished product an awareness raising tool for the public at large.	The comments sections will gather feedback from the users. Its popularity can be measured through analysis of the number of visits it gets, as well as from which country they originate.
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE	✓				
GBV	✓				
SEXUAL HARASSMENT	✓				
BULLYING	✓	Sports Day - a full day event taking place in the school where various team sports events will take place.	The event will have team sport activities for all age groups, and each team will include children from both Syrian and Lebanese groups. The sports activities can range from fun team activities like rope-pulling to a team relay obstacle course race.	Studies have shown that while Syrian children are allowed to attend Lebanese public schools, the two groups are still highly segregated, especially in cases where the Syrian and Lebanese children attend schools in different shifts. By providing a day where the children and young people can come together to interact in group settings that is free from social and political factors may create opportunities for mutual understanding and respect.	An immediate response as to whether the event works can be observed during the day while the events are taking place by looking for signs of cooperation and convivial time-sharing between the two groups. A more formal evaluation at a later date can be conducted in focus groups with the children on their experiences and attitudes. Extra focus groups can also be set up with teachers and parents to obtain their views and experiences on the event.
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE					
GBV					
SEXUAL HARASSMENT					
BULLYING		Gender-based Violence Workshops in schools, community centres, local NGO offices and settlements	A series of workshops can be planned for youths of both groups and both sexes, on the prevention of GBV, including a workshop highlighting what a woman can do/where to turn to for help/support if she is or has been in a sexual harassment situation.	Studies show high incidences of sexual harassment faced by Syrian women and young girls by the local community, a situation made further bleaker by their vulnerability to fall prey to human trafficking rings.	The evaluation on whether the workshops made an impact will have to be in a longer term. Local NGOs could report on the number of requests they receive for help, the young men and women who attended the workshops could be interviewed in focus groups to gather their perceptions on whether there has been a change in their community.
CONVIVIALITY					
EARLY MARRIAGE	✓				
GBV	✓				
SEXUAL HARASSMENT	✓				

Table 17 C4D recommendations (continued)

POSSIBLE TOPICS		WHAT	HOW	WHY	DID IT WORK?
BULLYING	✓	Social Media Campaign, using video testimonies of Syrian refugee youths	The campaign should revolve around a product that can be used for publicity, to generate interest and attention from public at large. Testimonies can be filmed and edited to make a short 3 to 5-minute video showcasing Syrian youth's hopes, dreams and what they are currently involve in (music, science, social projects, etc.) as a contribution to the community. For example, the Syrian rapper 'Chyno' would be a good candidate.	This is similar to UNICEF Lebanon's 'Imagine a School' project where short video testimonies of children were used to raise funds. The project reported a good success rate so given its experience, it would be relatively efficient to make a new one focusing on youth. It is also inspired by the #refugees social media campaign using a short video of famous people speaking on camera, revealing that they each have refugee genes in their ancestry, or if they are even refugees themselves. The idea is to counter the prejudice held about Syrian refugees, especially its youth.	Videos shared on social media can be measured based on the number of visits, likes, shares, and the kinds of comments provided.
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE					
GBV					
SEXUAL HARASSMENT					
BULLYING		Promoting the Activities with Celebrity Goodwill Ambassadors	Secure the involvement and endorsement of celebrities who have been vocal spokespersons for the campaign to provide the much-needed leverage to turn the negative attitudes about the Syrian refugees around. George Clooney and his Lebanese-born wife Amal could be good choices as they have been working with international organizations to shed light on the issue.	Celebrity influence is often used to create awareness surrounding a social issue, such as UN goodwill ambassadors. We are mindful of the critique surrounding the issue of superficiality and the narrative of the white saviour complex regarding Western celebrity endorsements of social issues, but the spokesperson selected should be someone who has worked in the field, and whose views reflect the campaign platforms.	It would be hard to attribute accurately the impact of the involvement of a celebrity. However, the publicity received by the campaign in the media, especially in terms of whether it is mentioned in relation to the celebrity provide general indications.
CONVIVIALITY	✓				
EARLY MARRIAGE					
GBV					
SEXUAL HARASSMENT					

7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Over the course of the project, which has been both compelling and also a little arduous, we have picked up a few lessons learned. We hope that sharing them would shed some light on our journey that will explain some of our experiences, but also serve as feedback for the project and the Production Project course at Malmö University.

7.1 LESSONS LEARNED, CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

As is often the case with international research projects, we face the obvious challenge of the language barrier. Our unfamiliarity with the Arabic language and culture (as that left us partially outside of the discourse) and not being based in Lebanon during the duration of the project, except for the one-week field trip to Beirut meant that, in the absence of quality translation, we were forced to discard Arabic-language sources⁴¹. It also meant that our access to local sources was somewhat limited, as we could only meet with a select few during our week in Lebanon and thereafter; we relied on Skype meetings to reach out to the experts who shared their knowledge with us.

Time was another limitation, since our project timeline span between mid-February to mid-June 2017. We did not have enough time for the cultural immersion that would have given us an ‘insider’s view’ of the Lebanese context, although we more than made up for it by the intense desk research we conducted during and after our Beirut trip. In addition to this, we had planned to conduct a survey about media consumption to be distributed among Syrian youth in Lebanon, but we were advised by our sources that the survey would need to be translated into Arabic, and of course the data gathered would have to be translated into English. The survey might have strengthened our results, but in the light of the time constraints, we had to dismiss it.

We were also cognizant that the recommendations made for projects and activities to be held in a country with a reputation for weak governmental structure and a high degree of sectarianism, would undoubtedly raise the question of how objectivity can be guaranteed in respect to the sources we come across; in other words, how to avoid bias. According to Middle East pundit Melani Cammett, ‘the Lebanese state is notoriously weak with respect to social provision and religious and sectarian organizations have long played a vital role in the health, education, and social assistance’ (Cammett, 2014). In the light of this citation, it would be logical to think that UNICEF would be better off collaborating with religious and sectarian organizations rather than the government, with whom UNICEF Lebanon is currently partnering. However, that would pose a conflict of interest, given that UNICEF, as well as academic institutions such as Malmö University, are supposed to be non-partisan. In view of this dilemma, we have mentioned the sectarian affiliation of media channels in this paper and its respective potential audience outreach groups, but we have refrained from making any specific recommendations on the media outlets.

We have also noted that at the organizational level, UNICEF Lebanon may be raising the funds and planning the interventions, but the actual communication interventions on the ground seem to be carried out by local third-parties (e.g. civil organizations and local NGOs partnering with UNICEF Lebanon). If that proves to be the case, it would have been better to assess the communication practices of the third-party organizations as well, but the task is too complicated given our academic deadlines. As it stands, we have abstained from conducting an extensive SWOT analysis on

⁴¹ Translated material was assessed carefully as well, on the assumption that translation is rarely neutral.

UNICEF’s communication practices in respect of their targeted population (as it might lead to incorrect assumptions and conclusions), and made general recommendations instead.

Whereas the present broad analysis including, among others, the C4D perspective is a communication tool (it conveys a message), we admit that it falls short of being a C4D product per se, because it does not give voice to the refugees themselves; we are talking about them but we should be careful to point out that we are not in a position to represent them.

7.2 THE WAY FORWARD

We are well aware that the promotion of a hybrid co-existence between Syrian refugees and the host community in a country that has been shaped and moulded by entrenched feelings due to years of regional wars is not an easy task. To achieve a sustainable and peaceful environment between the two groups would require years of consistent and targeted interventions, and involve a multitude of actors, based on pre-testing and deep research efforts. Given our involvement of only one academic term, this was unfortunately beyond the scope of our project.

We do, however, believe that ‘a journey of a million miles begins with the first step’. Thus, we have formed our recommendations, which are based on information collected from local sources and desk reviews, to at least provide the stepping stones to bigger and longer-lasting projects and activities, of which an international organization like UNICEF would be able to carry on in the foreseeable future. Our recommendations would also present future ComDev students the opportunity to test out the activities laid forward in this document, seeing that we have already laid down the ground work. The C4D recommendations in this document can be then explored and critiqued individually, compared, or contrasted. We hope that with this project paper, we have made a contribution to the literature and efforts currently existing to address the Syrian refugee crisis.

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9 APPENDIX 1: NEWS AGENCIES

National

Name	Arabic	English	French	Other	URL
AkhbarLubnan (Lebanon News Agency)	✓				Akhbarlubnan.net
National News Agency (NNA)	✓	✓	✓	Spanish	Nna-leb.gov.lb/en

International

Agence France Presse in Arabic (AFP)	✓		✓		www.afp.com/ar
Deutsche Presse Agentur in Arabic (DPA)	✓			German	www.dpa.com/ar
Reuters in Arabic	✓	✓			ara.reuters.com/

10 APPENDIX 2: NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Daily newspapers

Arabic	Armenian	English	French
Ad-Diyar (www.addiyar.com)	Ararad (Araraddaily.com)	The Daily Star (www.dailystar.com.lb)	Al-Balad (in French)
Al-Akhbar (www.al-akhbar.com)	Aztag Daily (www.aztagdaily.com)		L'Orient-Le Jour (www.lorientlejour.com)
Al-Amal	Zartok (www.zartokdaily.com)		
Al-Aman (Al-aman.com)			
Al-Anbaa (Anbaaonline.com)			
Al-Anwar (www.alanwar.com)			
Al-Balad (www.albaladonline.com)			
Al-Binaa (www.al-binaa.com)			
Al-Hadass (www.alhadassonline.com)			
Al-Hadath News (www.alhadathnews.net)			
Al-Hayat (www.alhayat.com)			
Al-Inshaa (www.al-inshaa.com)			
Al-Joumhouria (www.aljoumhouria.com)			
Al-Kifah Al-Arabi (www.news.kifahrabi.com)			
Al-Liwaa (www.aliwaa.com)			
Al-Markazia (www.almarkazia.net)			
Al-Modon (www.almodon.com)			
Al-Mustaqbal (www.almustaqbal.com)			

Daily newspapers (continued)

Arabic

Armenian

English

French

Al-Rassed
(www.alrassedonline.com)

An-Nahar
(www.annahar.com)

Asia News
(Asianewslb.com)

As-Safir
(Assafir.com)

Athabat
(www.athabat.net)

Beirut Observer
(www.beirutobserver.com)

Cedar News
(www.cedarnews.net)

Echo Beirut
(www.echobeirut.com)

Ekher El-Akhbar
(www.ekherelakhbar.com)

Enta Al-Akhabar
(www.entaalkhabar.com)

El-Marada
(Elmarada.org)

Elminieh.com
(www.elminieh.com)

El-Shark
(www.elshark.com)

Immar wa Iktissad
(Immarwaiktissad.com)

Janoubia
(Janoubia.com)

Kataeb
(www.kataeb.org)

Lebanon Only Debate
(www.lebanononlydebate.com)

Mulhak News
(www.mulhak.com)

Only Lebanon
(www.onlylebanon.net)

Daily newspapers (continued)

Arabic	Armenian	English	French
Radar News (www.radar-news.net)			
Ras Baalbeck Online (www.rasbaalbeckonline.com)			
Saida Online (www.saidaonline.com)			
Sinonia News (www.sidonianews.net)			

Online news portals

Arabic	Armenian	English	French
Akhbar Al-Yom (Akhbaralyawn.com)		Lebanese Examiner (www.lebaneseexaminer.com)	Iloubnan.info (www.iloubnan.info)
Alankabout (www.alankabout.com)		Lebanonwire (www.lebanonwire.com)	
Al-Awassef (Al-awassef.com)		Ya Libnan (Yalibnan.com)	
El-Nashra (www.elnashra.com)			
Lebanese Forces (www.lebanese-forces.com)			
Lebanon 24 (Lebanon24.com)			
Lebanon Debate (www.lebanondebate.com)			
Lebanon Files (www.lebanonfiles.com)			
Naharnet (Naharnet.com)			
NOW News (Now.mmedia.me/lb)			
Tayyar.org (www.tayyar.org)			
Ulinet.org (Ulinet.org)			

Non-daily publications

Arabic	Armenian	English	French
Al-Bayan (www.albayanmagazine.com)	Hask	Executive (www.executive-magazine.com)	La Revue du Liban (www.rdl.com.lb)
Al-Iktissad Wal-Aamal (www.iktissadonline.com)	Massis	Real Middle East (www.realmiddleeast.com)	Le Commerce du Levant (www.lecommerceduliban.com)
Al-Intiqad (www.alahednews.com.lb)	Pakin		L'Hebdo Magazine
Al-Jaras (Aljaras.com)			Prestige (www.prestigemag.co)
Al-Massira (www.almassira.com)			
Al-Nabad			
Al-Takwa (Altakwa.net)			
Al-Waie (www.al-waie.org)			
Al-Watan Al-Arabi (Alwatanalarabi.com)			
An-Nabaa (Annabaa.org)			
Ash-Shiraa (www.alshiraa.com)			
Assayad (www.al-sayad.com)			
At-Tamadon (www.attamadon.com)			
El-Hawadess			
El-Kalima (Zahlé) (www.el-kalima.com)			
Jasad (www.jasadmag.com)			
Sowar (www.sowarmag.com)			
Tahawolat			

11 APPENDIX 3: RADIO STATIONS

Radio Station	URL
Category I licence (news and political content)	
Al Lubnaniya (Radio Liban, state-run)	Libanradio.com
lthaat al-Nour	www.alhour.com.lb
LBI Radio Lebanon	Lbiradio.com
Radio Orient	Radiorientlb.com
Radio Sawa Lebanon	www.radiosawa.com
Radio Sawt El-Noujoum	www.sawtelnoujoum.com
Radio Sawt Al-Mada	Sawtelmada.com
Radio Sawt El-Ghad	www.sawtelghad.com
Radio Sawt Lubnan (Voix du Liban)	www.vdl.com.lb
Radio Sawt Luban Al-Hurr	www.rll.com.lb
Radio Voice of Lebanon	vdl.me
Category II licence (entertainment)	
Beirut Nights	Beirutnights.com
Byblos radio	Byblosradio.com
Fame FM	Famefm.com
Jaras Scoop FM	www.jarasfm.com
Mix FM 104.4	www.mixfm.com.lb
Radio Beirut	www.radiobeirut.net
Radio Delta Lebanon	Radiodelta.fm/main/
Radio Liban Culture	Clubccj.com/rtc/
Radio One Lebanon	Radioone.fm
Virgin Radio Lebanon	Virginradiolb.com

12 APPENDIX 4: TELEVISION STATIONS & NETWORKS

Television channel	URL	Political/sectarian alignment
Al-Jadeed (formerly known as New TV)	www.aljadeed.tv/arabic	Neutral
Al-Manar TV	www.almanar.com.lb	Hezbollah
Al-Mayadeen	www.almayadeen.net	Pan-Arabist
Future TV	www.futuretvnetwork.com	Future Movement
Lebanese Broadcasting Company (LBCi)	www.lbcgroup.tv	Neutral
Murr TV (MTV)	Mtv.com.lb	Anti-Syrian stance; March 14 Alliance
National Broadcasting Network (NBN)	www.nbn.com.lb	Amal Movement
Orange TV (OTV)	www.otv.com.lb	Free Patriotic Movement
Télé-Liban (state-run)	Teleliban.com.lb	Neutral
Télé-Lumière	Noursat.tv/ar/index.php	Christian

13 APPENDIX 5: ANNUAL CULTURAL EVENTS IN LEBANON

Name	Location	When	Genres Covered
Al Bustan International Festival of Music and the Arts	Beirut	January	Several
Beirut International Arab Book Fair	Beirut	December	Arabic literature
Beiteddine Arts Festival	Beiteddine castle	July	Music, drama, other arts
Byblos Festival	Byblos	July	Music
Baalbeck International Festival	Baalbeck Roman ruins	July	Music
Tyre and South Festival	Tyre	July	Dance, poetry, music, craft
Zouk Mikael International Festival	Zouk Mikael	July	Music

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